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I.

Introduction
This is an historic day for the United States and our six partners in
CAFTA-DR. This free trade agreement makes stronger the bond between
us and our neighbors. CAFTA-DR creates an alliance for fair trade and
will promote security and stability in our region. This is a win-win
agreement that benefits American workers with greater access to
important markets, and our trading partners with new economic
opportunities . . . America's support for CAFTA-DR sends a strong signal
to the world that the United States is committed to market liberalization.
We look forward to continuing to work with Congress and our trading
partners around the world to provide global opportunities for free and fair
trade through the Doha Development Agenda.1

1

USTR Press Release, Statement of Ambassador Portman on Signing of U.S.-Central AmericanDominican Republic Free Trade Agreement, Aug. 2, 2005, available at
http://www.ustr.gov/Document_Library/Press_Releases/2005/August/Statement_of_USTR_Rob_Portman_
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A.

CAFTA-DR in Context

In recent years, many nations, including the United States and to a somewhat
lesser extent the nations in Central America and the Caribbean, have participated in the
proliferation of “regional trade agreements” world-wide. The WTO secretariat estimates
that as of the end of 2005, based on notifications to the WTO, some 300 such agreements
would be in force by the end of 2005.2
The Central American – United States – Dominican Republic Free Trade
Agreement (“CAFTA-DR)3 is one in what is now an extensive list of post-NAFTA FTAs
concluded by the United States. Since 1999, the United States has concluded FTAs with
Jordan,4 Singapore,5 Chile,6 Morocco,7 Peru,8 Australia,9 Colombia,10 Oman11 and
on_Signing_of_US-Central_American-Dominican_Republic_Free_Trade_Agreement_printer.html (visited
Aug. 23, 2006).
2
WTO, Regional Trade Agreements, available at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/region_e.htm (visited Aug. 21, 2006).
3
Central American-Dominican Republic-United States Free Trade Agreement, Aug. 5, 2004, United
States, Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Dominican Republic, available at
http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/CAFTA/CAFTA-DR_Final_Texts/Section_Index.html
(visited Jul. 31, 2006) [hereinafter “CAFTA-DR]. (As of early 2007, in force for all but Costa Rica. It is
expected to enter into force for Costa Rica during the first quarter of 2007.) The United States, pursuant to
the implementing legislation, has implemented the Agreement on a country specific basis, “At such time as
the President determines that countries [party to the Agreement] have taken measures necessary to comply
with the provisions of the Agreement that are to take effect on the date on which the Agreement enters into
force . . . .” Dominican Republic-Central America- United States Free Trade Agreement Implementation
Act, sec. 101(b), P.L. 109-53, 119 Stat. 462, 19 U.S.C. § 4001 note (2005).
4
Agreement Between the United States of America and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan on the
Establishment of a Free Trade Area, Oct. 24, 2000 [hereinafter “Jordan FTA”], available at
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/Jordan/asset_upload_file250_5112.pdf (visited Jul.
31, 2006). This was a “bare-bones” agreement by current standards, with less than 20 pages of text
compared to hundreds with all of the other FTAS, and the only one concluded after NAFTA by the Clinton
Administration.
5
United States - Singapore Free Trade Agreement, May 6, 2003, U.S.-Sing., available at
http://www.ustr.gov/new/fta/Singapore/final/2004-01-15-final.pdf (last visited Feb. 11, 2004) [hereinafter
Singapore FTA].
6
United States - Chile Free Trade Agreement, June 6, 2003, U.S.-Chile,
http://www.ustr.gov/new/fta/Chile/ text/index.htm (last visited Feb. 11, 2004) [hereinafter Chile FTA]
7
United States – Morocco Free Trade Agreement, Jun. 15, 2004 [hereinafter “Morocco FTA”], available
at http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/Morocco_FTA/FInal_Text/Section_Index.html
(visited Jul. 31, 2006).
8
United States – Peru Trade Promotion Agreement, Apr. 12, 2006 [hereinafter “Peru FTA”], available at
http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/Peru_TPA/Final_Texts/Section_Index.html (visited Jul.
31, 2006). (Not in force.)
9
U.S. – Australia Free Trade Agreement, May 18, 2004 [hereinafter “Australia FTA”], available at
http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/Australia_FTA/Final_Text/Section_Index.html (visited
Jul. 31, 2006).
10
Proposed United States – Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement [not in force], [hereinafter “Colombia
FTA”], available at
http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/Colombia_FTA/Draft_Text/Section_Index.html (visited
Jul. 31, 2006).
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Bahrain.12 All of these except those with Peru and Colombia have received U.S. and
foreign congressional approval, and are or will soon be in force. Negotiations continue
at various levels of intensity with others.13 With the recent suspension of the WTO’s
“Doha Development Round” of global trade negotiations,14 it seems reasonable to assume
that the United States and other major trading nations will maintain or even step up their
efforts to conclude more regional trade agreements,15 even though opposition in the U.S.
Congress and the likely expiration of the President’s “Trade Promotion Authority” on
June 30, 200716 will likely make it difficult for the Bush Administration to undertake
major new FTAs, except perhaps for the one under negotiation with South Korea.
The Central American nations have experience with regional trade agreements
that pre-dates that of the United States. The initial instrument designed to create a
common market in Central America was signed in 1960,17 even though its full
implementation has been delayed by more than forty years of civil war and the lack of
political will to deal with well-entrenched business and labor interest groups. The fact
that most duties for trade within the five nation region (the Dominican Republic is not a
party) have finally been eliminated, and the common external tariff has been substantially
implemented, can likely be traced in significant part to the anticipation of CAFTA-DR,
and the need to increase Central American industrial competitiveness vis a vis Asia.18
There are also a number of bilateral FTAs between CAFTA-DR members and
other nations. Among the outside nations that have negotiated FTAs with Central
American nations are Mexico (Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras); Chile (all); the
Dominican Republic (all); Panama (all); Colombia (Guatemala); and Venezuela

11

U.S. – Oman Free Trade Agreement, Jan. 18, 2006, [hereinafter “Oman FTA”], available at
http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/Oman_FTA/Final_Text/Section_Index.html (visited Jul,
31, 2006).
12
Agreement between the Government of the United States and the Government of the Kingdom of
Bahrain on the Establishment of a Free Trade Agreement, Sep. 14, 2004, available at
http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/Bahrain_FTA/final_texts/Section_Index.html (visited Jul.
31, 2006).
13
Panama, Thailand, Malaysia, Ecuador (currently suspended pending resolution of U.S. investor
disputes), the United Arab Emirates and South Korea . Some information on each of these negotiations is
available from USTR; see http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/Section_Index.html (visited
Jul. 31, 2006).
14
Daniel Pruzin & Christopher S. Rugaber, WTO’s Doha Round Talks Collapse, as G-6 Meeting Ends in
Acrimony, 23 INT’L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1120 (Jul. 27, 2006).
15
See Steven Chase, WTO Talks Collapse after 5 Years, Jul. 24, 2005, available at
http://www.theglobeandmail.com (visited Jul. 25, 2006) (commenting that “trade watchers” expect more
bilateral free trade deals, with the “spaghetti bowl” effect of different agreements that hamper global
commerce).
16
19 U.S.C. §§ 3801 – 3814, 3803(b)(C)(ii) (2002). Renewal in 2007 is problematic.
17
General Treaty on Central American Economic Integration, Dec. 13, 1960, available at
http://www.sice.oas.org/trade/camertoc.asp (visited Jul. 31, 2006). (As usual, Costa Rica didn’t get around
to signing until a couple of years later.)
18
Carol Osmond et al., Final Report, Implementation of Customs-Related Business Facilitations
Measures as Part of the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) Process, Oct. 31, 2004, Annex A (copy
on file with author).
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(Guatemala).19 The Dominican Republic’s only (other) regional trade agreement other
than CAFTA-DR and the one with the Central American states is a more limited, older
(1985) agreement with Panama.20 Costa Rica has concluded an FTA with Canada, 21 and
has concluded FTAs or similar agreements with the Caribbean group CARICOM,
Panama, Mexico, Colombia and Venezuela.22 The Central American nations (except
Costa Rica) have been negotiating an FTA with Canada for at least four years, but to date
agreement has not been reached.23 It was expected that negotiations of a long-discussed
FTA between Central American and the European Union would be initiated before the
end of 2006.24 However, many of the non-U.S. agreements do not have full coverage of
such areas as investment and intellectual property.25
As indicated above, all of the NAFTA Parties have attempted FTAs with Central
America, but only the United States has managed to conclude one with all five of the
Central American nations. The United States, of course, has the most to offer with regard
to market access for both agricultural and manufactured goods, even if, as one observer
has rather critically put it, that “access involves idiosyncratic rules, self-defeating tradeoffs, uneven playing fields, and political benefits overshadowing economic costs. The
US sets the standards. . . .”26 For Canada, it may be that concluding negotiations is more
difficult where development preconditions, human rights, democratic governance and the
like are preconditions for negotiations,27 all of which have been met only for Costa Rica.
For Mexico it has been possible to conclude agreements with the northern Central
American nations despite somewhat differing historical relationships and earlier
frictions.28 However, given the large number of Mexican FTAs with various countries

19

SICE [OAS], Free Trade Agreements with Guatemala, available at
http://www.sice.oas.org/Trade/gua_e.ASP (visited Jul. 31, 2006).
20
SICE, Free Trade Agreements with the Dominican Republic, available at
http://www.sice.oas.org/Trade/domrep_e.ASP (visited Jul. 31, 2006).
21
Canada – Costa Rica Free Trade Agreement, Apr. 2001, available at http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/tnanac/Costa_Rica_toc-en.asp (visited Jul. 31, 2006).
22
SICE [OAS], Free Trade Agreements with Costa Rica, available at
http://www.sice.oas.org/Trade/cos_e.ASP (visited Jul. 31, 2006).
23
The negotiations were initiated in the fall of 2001, with the most recent negotiations held in February
2004. Foreign Affairs and Int’l Trade Canada, Canada and Central America Four Free Trade
Negotiations, available at http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/tna-nac/ca4-en.asp (visited Jul. 31, 2006).
24
See EU – Central American Summit Joint Communiqué, May 13, 2006, para. 2, available at
http://europa.eu.int/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=PRES/06/139&format=HTML&aged=0&lang
uage=EN&guiLanguage=en (visited Aug. 21, 2006).
25
As discussed infra, the United States has for decades sought bilateral agreements (either as part of FTAs
or free-standing), protecting U.S. investors abroad against adverse actions by host countries. Also, since
well before NAFTA and after the entry into force of the WTO’s Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights(TRIPS) (available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/27-trips.doc),
protection of U.S. intellectual property—ranging from copyrights, patents and trademarks to chip masks
and certain Internet content—has also been a hallmark of U.S. international economic policy.
26
A. IMTIAZ HUSSAIN, RUNNING ON EMPTY IN CENTRAL AMERICA? CANADIAN, MEXICAN, AND US
INTEGRATIVE EFFORTS 15 (Univ. Press of America, 2006).
27
Id. at 57.
28
Id. at 54-55.
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both within and outside Latin America29 it isn’t surprising that most of the Central
American nations (except Nicaragua) are included.
The U.S. FTAs, including CAFTA-DR, while varying considerably in their
content and coverage, share far more similarities than differences. All are extensively
patterned after the North American Free Trade Agreement of 1994 (NAFTA),30 in that
they are comprehensive agreements that deal with tariff and non-tariff barrier elimination
for trade in goods (including extensive but not full coverage of agriculture), rules of
origin, and also include chapters on standards, sanitary and phytosanitary measures,
government procurement, intellectual property (with some rules going beyond the
requirements of the WTO’s Agreement on Trade Related Intellectual Property
(“TRIPS”)),31 services, investment32, rudimentary competition law, labor rights and the
environment.33 As with all post-NAFTA U.S. FTAs, CAFTA-DR treat labor rights and
environmental protection in the body of the Agreement rather than in separate “side”
agreements.
CAFTA-DR consists of 22 chapters, most with self-contained annexes; a “market
access” annex (rules of interpretation); product specific rules of origin (143 pages);
Annex I (specific exceptions on a country-specific basis); Annex II (additional nonconforming measures); Annex III (financial services non-conforming measures); Tariff
schedules for each of the seven Parties; and an extensive series of “side letters”, again on
a country by country basis.34 This means, of course, that there are few CAFTA-DR legal
questions that can be safely answered by simply reviewing one or two provisions, or even
one annex. With investment, in particular, not only Chapter 10 but Annexes I and II are
likely critical to any analysis.
With a few exceptions—Australia, Singapore and South Korea (if successfully
negotiated)—all post-NAFTA U.S. FTAs are with developing (or near-developing)
countries, particularly small developing countries such as those in Central America and
the northern half of South America. Since trade with none of these FTA partners—with
29

More than a dozen, according to the OAS website, http://www.sice.oas.org/tradee.asp (visited Nov. 14,
2006).
30
North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, U.S. – Mexico – Canada, [hereinafter
“NAFTA”], 32 I.L.M. 289 (1993), also available at http://www.nafta-secalena.org/DefaultSite/index_e.aspx?CategoryId=42 (full text and annexes) (visited Jul. 31, 2006).
31
Annex 1c of the Marrakech Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 14, 1994,
available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/27-trips.doc (visited Jul. 31, 2006).
32
The Australia FTA lacks mandatory investor-state arbitration, although standards for treatment of
foreign investors are included; there are no investment provisions in the Jordan FTA, but the U.S. and
Jordan concluded a bilateral investment treaty in 1997 that entered into force in 2003. U.S. Dept. of State,
U.S. Bilateral Investment Treaty Program (Nov. 7, 2005), at 2, available at
http://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/fs/22422.htm (visited Aug. 2, 2006) [hereinafter “USBIT Program”].
33
All of the post-NAFTA agreements contain some form of labor and environmental provisions in the
body of the agreement, rather than in the two NAFTA “side agreements,” the North American Agreement
on Environmental Cooperation (“NAAEC”), Sep. 13, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1482 (1993), available at
http://www.cec.org/pubs_info_resources/law_treat_agree/naaec/index.cfm?varlan=english (visited Jul. 31,
2006); and the North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation (“NAALC”), Sep. 13, 1993, 32 I.L.M.
1502 (1993) available at http://www.naalc.org/english/agreement.shtml (visited Jul. 31, 2006).
34
CAFTA-DR, supra note 3, passim.
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the possible exception of Singapore and South Korea—is in itself significant for the
United States (particularly compared to NAFTA),35 one needs to be aware of other
important U.S. interests that may be advanced by the accords. These include security
issues with regard to Jordan, Oman, Morocco, Bahrain and Singapore, and the
advancement of economic development/democratic institutions/rule of law with CAFTADR, Peru, Colombia and Ecuador (discussed in more detail below).
B.

The Importance of Dispute Settlement Provisions in FTAs

While there are many areas of these agreements that could benefit from close
analysis by those who will be directly affected by them—including but not limited to
rules of origin, transparency, trade facilitation, environmental protection and labor
protection—this article focuses on the area of settlement of disputes, those involving
foreign investment, and those relating to disagreements among the state-Parties over the
application and interpretation of the FTA. NAFTA’s investment dispute Chapter 11 has
been one of the most widely used—and controversial-- of all NAFTA mechanisms, with
the Chapter 20 government to government mechanism less used. In the aggregate, the
three major areas of NAFTA dispute settlement, Chapter 11 (investment), Chapter 19
(review of antidumping and countervailing duty administrative actions) and Chapter 20
(general dispute settlement), have involved literally hundreds of proceedings over a 12
year period.36 (The separate NAFTA side agreements on labor and on environment have
also generated numerous citizen complaints, but no arbitrations.37)
The task of analyzing CAFTA-DR dispute settlement is considerably easier than
with NAFTA, since there are only two major mechanisms, for investment and for
government to government disputes. Labor and environmental obligations have been
merged into the text of the Agreement; they are no longer separate, and are thus discussed
in the context of government to government dispute settlement. Also, the NAFTA

35

Two - way trade with South Korea in 2005 was approximately $72 billion, while that among the
NAFTA partners was in excess of $772 billion in 2005, with Australia, $ 30.1 billion, with Malaysia, about
$38 billion, (both 2004) and that between the CAFTA-DR nations and the United States (2003) was about
$32 billion. Ministro de Economia [Mexico], available at
http://www.economia.gob.mx/index.jsp?P=2113&NLang=en (visited Aug. 21, 2006); USTR Press
Release, United States, South Korea Announce Intention to Negotiate Free Trade Agreement, Feb. 2, 2006,
at 1, available at http://www.ustr.gov (visited Aug. 21, 2006); USTR Press Statement, USTR Zoellick
Statement at Signing of U.S.-D.R.-Central America FTA, Aug. 5, 2004, at 2, available at
http://www.ustr.gov (visited Aug. 21, 2006). Other two-way trade data (Australia, Malaysia) can also be
found in the State Department’s “background notes,” available at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/ (visited
Nov. 14, 2006).
36
See David A. Gantz, The United States and NAFTA Dispute Settlement: Ambivalence, Frustration and
Occasional Defiance, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=918542 (visited Dec.
15, 2006) [hereinafter “NAFTA Dispute Settlement”]
37
Fifty-five submissions have been made under the NAFTA Environmental side agreement through midJuly 2006; see Commission for Environmental Cooperation, Citizen Submissions on Enforcement Matters,
available at http://cec.org/citizen/status/index.cfm?varlan=english visited Jul. 31, 2006); 28 public
submissions had been filed under the NAALC (through March 2004); see Commission for Labor
Cooperation, Summary of Public Communications, available at
http://www.naalc.org/english/pdf/pcommtable_en.pdf (visited Jul. 31, 2006).
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Chapter 19 mechanism for review of unfair trade actions has not been replicated in
CAFTA-DR, or in any other U.S. free trade agreement.38
Investment is, of course, a key element of U.S. FTAs, beginning with the U.S.Canada FTA in 1988. Nor, apparently, is the U.S. alone. According to a recent
UNCTAD study, “International investment rules are increasingly being adopted as part of
agreements that address inter alia trade and investment.”39 The region is not a major
destination for U.S. direct foreign investment; as of 2005, aggregate DFI for the six
CAFTA-DR countries was only about $4 billion, roughly 5% of U.S. FDI in Mexico, and
flows were erratic.40 While there appears to be little empirical data demonstrating that
investment protection agreements directly stimulate DFI, it seems intuitively correct to
believe that to attract investment to small markets with few natural resources, a more
favorable investment climate could be an important factor in encouraging foreign
investment, and investment agreements, along with political stability, a well-functioning
legal system, educated workers, reasonable labor and tax laws and good infrastructure,
are relevant to investment decisions.41 In any event, U.S. FTAs almost invariably include
investment protection provisions,42 and well prior to the CAFTA-DR, three of the six
developing country Parties had negotiated bilateral investment treaties with the United
States.43
Also, with seven Parties instead of three, six of which have a significantly lower
stage of economic development and experience with international economic agreements
than any of the NAFTA parties, disputes regarding the application and interpretation of
the Agreement are almost inevitable. While the Parties are all members of the WTO, and
thus have available the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Body (“DSB”)44, the various
38

The reasons for this are somewhat complex; see discussion in NAFTA Dispute Settlement, supra note
36, Part II.
39
UNCTAD, Investment Provisions in Economic Integration Agreements (UN, 2006), at 1, available at
http://www.unctad.org/templates/webflyer.asp?docid=6935&intItemID=2310&lang=1 (visited Dec. 22,
2006).
40
U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, available at
http://www.bea.gov/bea/di/usdctry/longctry.htm (visited Aug. 2, 2006). FDI for the six CAFTA-DR
countries was $3.989 billion, compared to $71.423 billion for Mexico.
41
A recent study concludes that bilateral investment treaties [and, presumably, similar provisions of
FTAs] “do indeed have a positive impact on FDI flows to developing countries,” as a signal of welcome to
foreign investors, but that conclusion of a BIT alone does not permit developing countries to “avoid the
hard work of improving their own domestic environment as it affects the political risks of investment.”
Jennifer Tobin & Susan Rose-Ackerman, When BITs Have Some Bite: the Political-Economic Environment
for Bilateral Investment Treaties, Nov. 14, 2006, at 30-31, available at
http://www.law.yale.edu/documents/pdf/When_BITs_Have_Some_Bite.doc (visited Dec. 15, 2006).
42
The Australia FTA lacks mandatory investor-state arbitration; there are no investment provisions in the
Jordan FTA, but the U.S. and Jordan concluded a bilateral investment treaty in 1997 that entered into force
in 2003. U.S. Dept. of State, U.S. Bilateral Investment Treaty Program (Nov. 7, 2005), at 2, available at
http://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/fs/22422.htm (visited Aug. 2, 2006) [hereinafter “USBIT Program”
43
El Salvador (1999), Honduras (1995) and Nicaragua (1995). Only the Honduras agreement actually
entered into force. U.S. BIT Program, supra note 32, at 2.
44
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Annex 2 to the
Marrakech Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 14, 1994, available at
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/04-wto.doc (visited Aug. 14, 2006) [hereinafter “DSU”].
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provisions of CAFTA-DR that are not covered by the WTO agreements, including but
not limited to provisions on labor and environment, and some of those in the intellectual
property area, make at least some Chapter 20 disputes likely.
This article is intended both to explain the dispute settlement provisions, and to
highlight the differences in CAFTA-DR compared to NAFTA. It is not, however, a
comprehensive analysis of the NAFTA jurisprudence, particularly the many tribunal
decisions under the NAFTA Chapter 11 investment provisions.45 In the analysis, the
author has tried to steer a middle ground between readers with sophisticated expertise in
investment agreements and investor-state arbitration, and those who are newer to the
area, realizing that some of the commentary will be overly-simplistic for some, and
perhaps too complex for others, for which he apologizes in advance.
Part II constitutes a brief summary of CAFTA-DR and its objectives, primarily
but not exclusively from the point of view of the United States. It attempts to answer, at
least in part, what is perhaps the most obvious question: why did the United States
government devote an enormous volume of negotiating resources, and considerable
political capital, to secure the conclusion and congressional approval of an FTA than
when fully in force will produce only about as much trade annually as NAFTA does in
three weeks?
Part III focuses on CAFTA-DR Chapter 10, Section A, the protections for foreign
investors afforded under the Agreement. Part IV discusses the actual process of investorstate international arbitration, as structured in Section B of Chapter 10. Both draw as
appropriate on other sections of CAFTA-DR, including the Chapter 11 definitions and
annexes, and general annexes I and II. All of these provisions are patterned closely but
by no means slavishly on NAFTA’s Chapter 11, with subtle and not so subtle changes
reflecting the NAFTA experience.46 Even more recent FTAs, such as those with
Colombia and Peru, contain further innovations, including the treatment under the
investment chapter of restructuring of foreign debt.47
Part V discusses the government to government dispute settlement mechanism
created under CAFTA-DR Chapter 20, with particular attention to a series of procedural
additions, and a potential increase in jurisdiction resulting from including the labor and
environment provisions in the body of CAFTA-DR rather than in “side” agreements
45

See, e.g., NAFTA: INVESTMENT LAW AND ARBITRATION: PAST ISSUES, CURRENT PRACTICE, FUTURE
PROSPECTS (Todd Weiler, ed., Transnational Publ. 2004) (discussing various aspects of Chapter 11 dispute
settlement, including the case law).
46

The author has undertaken a somewhat similar analysis with regard to the Chile FTA; see David A.
Gantz, The Evolution of FTA Investment Provisions: From NAFTA to the United States – Chile Free Trade
Agreement, 19 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 680 (2004) [hereinafter, “Gantz – Evolution”].
47
See, e.g., United States – Peru Trade Promotion Agreement, Annex 10-F, Apr. 12, 2006, available at
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/Peru_TPA/Final_Texts/asset_upload_file483_9547
.pdf (visited Nov. 14, 2006) (providing that no award may be made for default or non-payment of public
debt unless there is a tribunal finding of expropriation or breach of another Section A obligation;
commercial risks involved in the purchase of public debt are excluded).
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under NAFTA. Part VI attempts to draw some conclusions as to how the dispute
settlement mechanisms will function under CAFTA-DR.
At the risk of stating the obvious, since CAFTA-DR is not yet fully in force,48
any commentary about the likely usage rate of its dispute settlement provisions is largely
speculative, although some predictions can be made based on the NAFTA experience.
The author’s best guess is that the overall the numbers will be lower, since CAFTA-DR
does not incorporate a mechanism for review of administrative determinations in unfair
trade, actions along the lines of NAFTA’s Chapter 19.49 These usage rates may,
however, be affected by the manner in which the Free Trade Commission under the
Agreement goes about implementing various procedural steps, such as appointing the
roster of potential arbitrators for government-to-government disputes50 and those
questions likely will not be addressed by the Commission until the Agreement has gone
into force for all of the Parties.51 In the end, as with NAFTA, the viability of the dispute
settlement mechanisms, particularly Chapter 20, will depend on whether the governments
implement them in good faith.
II.

The Broader Significance of CAFTA-DR

CAFTA-DR is of course concerned first of all with increasing trade among the
Parties, particularly the volume of two - way trade between the United States and each of
the others. However, the agreement is probably as much a vehicle for economic
development as it is for trade expansion per se, more so than NAFTA or any other earlier
FTA, in such areas as rule of law, “trade capacity building,” customs procedures,
regulatory transparency, private property rights, competition, “civil society” participation,
environmental protection, and labor law. Forty-five years after the General Treaty on
Central American Economic Integration was concluded, in 1960, the CAFTA, along with
promised negotiations of an FTA with the European Union, may provide the necessary
impetus for the Central American nations to complete the customs union and
harmonization of commercial law that was agreed to so long ago.52
USTR’s statement at the signing of the CAFTA-DR, quoted at the
beginning of this article, sums up the multiple U.S. motives for the FTA. These
considerations included strengthening economic and other ties with six small
nations, none of them major U.S. trading partners, but most—Guatemala, El
Salvador, the Dominican Republic, Nicaragua-- nations in which the United
States has politically intervened in the past, sometimes with disastrous results.53
48

As of early 2007, it had entered into force for the United States vis a vis all signatories except Costa
Rica.
49
Neither CAFTA-DR, nor any of the other post- NAFTA U.S. FTAs, nor any post – NAFTA FTAs
concluded by Canada or Mexico, replicate the NAFTA Chapter 19 provisions.
50
CAFTA-DR, art. 20.7.
51
Telephone conversation with USTR Lawyer, Aug. 17, 2006.
52
See discussion in David A. Gantz, The Free Trade Area of the Americas: An Idea Whose Time Has
Come – and Gone?, [hereinafter “Gantz, FTAA”] 1 LOYOLA INT’L L. REV. 179, 194-195 (2004).
53
See STEPHEN KINZER, OVERTHROW: AMERICA’S REGIME CHANGE FROM HAWAII TO IRAQ 56-77
[Nicaragua], 129-147 [Guatemala] (Times Books, 2006); See U.S. Library of Congress, Civil War and
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Security and stability in the region, perhaps with a great concern for democracy
than in the past, remains a U.S. objective in the post 9/11 world, as does illegal
immigration from the region. As another USTR document noted, “In the 1980s,
Central America was characterized by civil war, chaos, dictators, and Communist
insurgencies. Today, Central America is a region of fragile democracies that need
U.S. support . . . CAFTA-DR is a way for America to support freedom,
democracy and economic reform in our own neighborhood.”54
Second, probably for U.S. domestic audiences, “fair” trade is there,
through market forces and the creation of “economic opportunities” designed to
stimulate economic development, job growth and exports. This is more than lip
service, given the extensive CAFTA-DR provisions on trade facilitation55 and
trade capacity building,56 but it doesn’t extend to market opening in sugar; USTR
boasted that increased sugar imports from the region—a major producer—
amounted to only a bit more than one day’s U.S. production.57 Even though trade
volumes are small compared to NAFTA, the roughly $15 billion in exports to the
six CAFTA-DR nations in 2004 made the group the 14th largest U.S. export
market worldwide, and second after Mexico in Latin America.58 For the Central
United States Intervention, (undated) available at http://countrystudies.us/dominican-republic/13.htm
(visited Dec. 15, 2006).
54
USTR, The Case for CAFTA, Feb. 2005, at 1 [hereinafter “CAFTA Facts”], available at
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/CAFTA/Briefing_Book/asset_upload_file235_717
8.pdf (visited Jul. 31, 2006).
55
CAFTA-DR, ch. 5.
56
Id.,, ch. 19B.
57
CAFTA Facts, supra note 54, at 2.
58
USTR, Small Countries, Big Markets, Feb. 2005, at 1, available at
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/CAFTA/Briefing_Book/asset_upload_file118_718
0.pdf (visited Aug. 25, 2006).
59
See State Department Background Notes, Costa Rica (Jun. 2006, at 2), Dominican Republic (Jun. 2006,
at 2), El Salvador (Dec. 2005, at 1), Guatemala (Nov. 2005, at 2), Honduras (Jan. 2006, at 2)and Nicaragua
(Nov. 2005, at 2), available at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/1850.htm (visited Aug. 23, 2006).
60
Despite the sensitivity of textiles and apparel, some significant additional market opportunities were
afforded in that sector, but with duty-free, quota free entry permitted in most instances only if U.S. or
regional fabric and yarns were used. This was rightfully justified on a global competitiveness basis:
“[W]ith the expiration of global quotas on textiles/apparel at the end of 2004, regional producers face a new
competitive challenge from Asian imports. CAFTA would provide regional garment-makers – and their
U.S. or regional suppliers of fabric and yarn—a critical advantage in competing with Asia.”
CAFTA Facts, supra note 54, at 1.
61
The signing of CAFTA-DR came at a time when it was becoming more and more obvious that the
United States’ initiative for a “Free Trade Area of the Americas” was foundering and would likely be
abandoned. See, e.g., Gantz, FTAA, supra note 52, at 183-192 (exploring the reasons why the FTAA
seemed doomed to failure).
62
USTR termed these as “Strong Protections for Labor and the Environment,” noting that the agreement
provisions were designed to focus on assisting the CAFTA-DR nations in enforcing core ILO principles
63
CAFTA-DR, Chs. 16 (labor) and 17 (environment). CAFTA Facts, supra note 54, at 2.
64
See Pelosi Statement in Opposition to CAFTA, May 28, 2004, available at
http://democraticleader.house.gov/press/releases.cfm?pressReleaseID=589 (visited Aug. 23, 2006)
(statement of then House Democratic leader explaining opposition to CAFTA-DR, largely on grounds of
insufficient protection of labor rights and the environment).
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American nations, the United States is the most important market, representing
from about 35% to over 80% of total trade,59 and for some sectors, such as
apparel, U.S. market access is significantly expanded;60 trade with the United
States is thus far more important to those countries than to the United States.
Third, CAFTA-DR (and other FTAs like it) were intended to have a
demonstration effect of the United States commitment to freer trade (and perhaps
a not so veiled threat) at the global as well as the regional level, including the
likelihood that if everyone won’t seek these goals, the United States will negotiate
with those who will.61
Unmentioned in Ambassador Portman’s statement, but showcased
elsewhere62, was the fact that CAFTA-DR contains language designed to protect
to at least some degree internationally recognized labor rights and the
environment.63 These controversial (and to some, overly weak) provisions, which
almost led to the defeat of CAFTA-DR in the U.S. Congress because of
Democratic opposition,64 are largely beyond the scope of a discussion of CAFTADR dispute settlement, except to a limited degree in Part V. The post-NAFTA
U.S. FTAs make the labor and environmental provisions—whether or not
considered otherwise sufficient—subject to the general dispute settlement
mechanism (Chapter 20 in CAFTA-DR) rather than to separate agreements as in
the case of NAFTA.
III.

Investment Protection Under CAFTA-DR Chapter 10

Despite the differences among U.S. FTAs, it is the author’s view that an
understanding of NAFTA is essential to an understanding of these newer FTAs, and with
such understanding a person with reasonable expertise in NAFTA can relatively quickly
attain similar expertise in dealing with the provisions of CAFTA-DR and similar
agreements. This seems particularly true with regard to protection of investment
provisions. As with NAFTA, CAFTA-DR’s investment chapter is divided into three
major sections, investment, investor-state dispute settlement and definitions. Also as
with NAFTA, CAFTA-DR contains a series of annexes reserving the right to temporarily
or permanently reject or limit foreign investment in certain sectors. However, CAFTADR, unlike NAFTA, also contains a series of investment specific reservations and
clarifications and procedural requirements, many of which are discussed in this section or
in Part IV.
A. The NAFTA Background and Influence
NAFTA’s investment provisions, as many readers will likely recall, were
anything but radical when incorporated into the agreement. The obligations to investors
language (Section A), were taken in significant part from the U.S. – Canada Free Trade
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Agreement,65 and both the obligations to investors and the dispute settlement provisions
(Section B) reflected what at the time was more than a decade of U.S. experience
concluding bilateral investment treaties (“BITs”) with various developing nations.66 By
the time CAFTA-DR was negotiated, the negotiators (presumably for all parties) were
aware of extensive investor-state litigation under NAFTA, some of which was relevant
and some not to the situation of the six developing country CAFTA-DR parties. That
history—and Congressional perception of it—caused a significant reshaping of the
CAFTA-DR investment provisions compared to NAFTA’s.
As far as the author has been able to determine over time, none of the NAFTA
negotiators thought much about NAFTA’s major departure from the BITs negotiated
earlier; all of the earlier agreements with mandatory investor-state arbitration were with
developing, capital importing nations, rather than a developed, capital exporting (as well
as importing) nation such as Canada. The conventional wisdom seems to have been an
assumption that the Chapter 11 provisions would be used almost exclusively by United
States and Canadian investors in Mexico, and hardly ever by Mexican investors against
Canada and the United States, simply because both the United States and Canada
maintained highly developed legal systems with independent, non-corrupt, well-educated
judiciaries. Why, under those circumstances, would anyone prefer international
arbitration to domestic courts?
In retrospect, this view may seem naïve, but at the time it seemed logical enough
to this author, and the likelihood of multiple disputes between United States investors and
Canada, or vice-versa, did not appear to be a matter for concern.67 Even if the concerns
had been raised, they probably would not have significantly changed the agreement.
Protection for foreign investors was a key objective of NAFTA (since job creation in
Mexico was thought to depend on it), and there was no precedent for including such
provisions in an FTA or BIT unless they were equally applicable to all parties.
The volume of U.S. – Canada investment is sufficiently enormous-- $175 billion
from the U.S. to Canada and $134 billion from Canada to the United States, 68 to assure
that there are at least a few actual or potential disputes with each host government. Also,
there is a sufficient cadre of well-trained, aggressive and creative attorneys in each
country, even given the well-respected national court systems, so that testing of the limits
of investment treaty protections might have been anticipated. Finally, there is probably
65

United States – Canada Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 1997-Jan. 1998 [U.S. –Can.], 27 I.L.M. 281 (1998)
[hereinafter “CFTA”], Ch. 16.
66
See Daniel M. Price & P. Bryan Christy, III, Overview of the NAFTA Investment Chapter: Substantive
Rules and Investor-State Dispute Settlement in THE NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT: A NEW
FRONTIER IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INVESTMENT IN THE AMERICAS 165, 167 (Judith H. Bello et al.,
eds. (ABA, 1993) (discussing the negotiation and conclusion of the investment chapter by the principal
negotiator, Dan Price); K. Scott Gudgeon, United States Bilateral Investment Treaties: Comments on their
Origin Purposes and General Treatment Standards, 4 Int’l Tax & Bus. Law 105 (1986) (discussion of the
origin and early experience of the U.S. bilateral investment treaty program by one of the State Department
negotiators).
67
These issues are discussed at greater length in Gantz – Evolution, supra note 46, at 693-695.
68
U.S. Dept. of State, “Background Note: Canada” (Jul. 2006), at 5, available at
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2089.htm (visited Jul. 31, 2006).
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no government on earth in which regulatory actions couched in terms of protecting the
environment or worker rights or other worthwhile purposes are not in fact occasionally
taken for protectionist purposes, or are simply arbitrary, discriminatory or unreasonable.
In any event, in actual experience, of the roughly forty-two matters notified to the
NAFTA Parties under Chapter 11, almost two thirds have been by American investors
against Canada, or Canadian investors against the United States.69
NAFTA’s experience has thus been a particularly educational, if occasionally
painful, one for the NAFTA governments, including the United States, whose
government lawyers are no more fond of losing court or arbitral decisions than other
attorneys, and whose Members of Congress or Parliament don’t particularly want to
spend taxpayer money on foreign investor claims (whatever else they may be willing to
spend it on). This concern persists despite the fact that the United States has never lost a
NAFTA tribunal decision that found it in violation of NAFTA or required it to
compensate a foreign investor. To the extent possible, the perceived errors in opening
too wide the doors in NAFTA Chapter 11 would not be made in subsequent FTA
investment chapters or BITs.
Some of the specific government and congressional concerns are discussed below,
in the analysis of certain CAFTA-DR Chapter 10 provisions. The most notable relate to
a) the types of conflicts between legitimate government regulatory actions (particularly
those designed to protect the environment) and “takings” that would be compensable
under the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution;70 b) NAFTA tribunal review of
decisions of national courts; and c) the possibility that foreign citizens bringing NAFTA
investment claims may end up with greater rights than American citizens facing the same
governmental action would have under what may be their only available remedy, the 5th
Amendment to the United States Constitution.
In particular, criticism has focused on two actions against the United States,
Methanex v. United States71 and Loewen Group v. United States.72 The first involved an
69

This is based on the best information available regarding the number of “notices of intent to submit a
claim to arbitration” under NAFTA, Art. 1119. It can be reasonably argued that this is an imperfect
measure, since not all such notices of intent resulted in actual claim submissions under NAFTA, Art. 1120,
and even fewer were pursued through arbitration. On the other hand, it is at least possible that other notices
of intent were filed which have never become public. Regardless of what criterion is used, there have been
a very significant number of proceedings in which American investors brought claims against Canada, and
vice versa. In the author’s view, the best source of information on NAFTA claims—and by far the easiest
to navigate—is a proprietary but free website managed by attorney Todd Weiler,
http://www.naftaclaims.com, which has fewer gaps that the three government website.
70
See, e.g., Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302
(2002) (holding, inter alia¸ that a temporary moratorium on building in the Lake Tahoe basis did not
constitute a compensable taking). The relevant clause in the 5th Amendment states only that “[N]or shall
private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.”
71
Methanex v. United States (Preliminary Award on Jurisdiction) (Aug. 7, 2002), 42 I.L.M. 514 (2003)
[hereinafter Methanex I]; Methanex v. United States (Final Award on Jurisdiction and Merits] Aug. 3, 2005
[hereinafter Methanex II], available at http://www.naftaclaims.com.
72
Loewen Group Inc. v. United States (Award) (Jun. 26, 2003),42 I.L.M. 811 (2003) [hereinafter
“Loewen I”]; Loewen Group, Inc. v. United States (Decision on Request for Consideration) (Sep. 13,
2004), 44 I.L.M. 836 (2005) [hereinafter “Loewen II”].
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alleged “regulatory” taking, based on a California decision to ban a gasoline additive,
MTBE, allegedly on health grounds, to the detriment of Methanex’ methanol production
operations. The original tribunal dismissed the claim on the grounds that Methanex
lacked a sufficient nexus under the “relating to” language under NAFTA, Art. 1101, since
Methanex produced not the MTBE but only its prime ingredient, methanol.73 Ultimately,
all claims against the U.S. were dismissed either on jurisdictional grounds or on the
merits,74 but not before the lengthy proceedings raised serious concerns among NGOs
and some Members of Congress over the prospect of such environmental action costing
the United States or California hundreds of millions of dollars, and have a chilling effect
on necessary government regulation in the future.
Loewen raised the specter of NAFTA review, ultimately on denial of justice
grounds, of a decision of a Mississippi state court. That case too was ultimately
dismissed on procedural grounds and for failure of one of the claimants to exhaust his
local remedies as required under international law, but only after the tribunal
characterized the Mississippi proceedings as a “disgrace.”75 In fact, it established a very
high standard—denial of justice under international law—for effective second-guessing
of a national court decision.
These cases led to various public objections, and ultimately to negotiating
objectives and guidelines (not mandatory but to be ignored only at the president’s peril)
for future investment provisions in international trade agreements and BITs. These
guidelines were embodied in the 2002 U.S. “Trade Promotion Authority” allowing the
President to negotiate future trade agreements and BITs:
[T]he principal negotiating objectives of the United States regarding
foreign investment are to reduce or eliminate artificial or trade-distorting
barriers to foreign investment, while ensuring that foreign investors in the
United States are not accorded greater substantive rights with respect to
investment protections than United States investors in the United States,
and to secure for investors important rights comparable to those that
would be available under United States legal principles and practice, by (A) reducing or eliminating exceptions to the principle of national
treatment:

. . . .76
73
74
75
76

***
(D) seeking to establish standards for expropriation and compensation for
expropriation, consistent with United States legal principles and practice;
(E) seeking to establish standards for fair and equitable treatment consistent with
United States legal principles and practice, including the principle of due process

Methanex I, supra note 71, para. 172(2).
Methanex II, supra note 71, Tribunal’s Operative Order, at 300.
Loewen I, supra note 72, paras. 119, 137, 217, 240; Loewen II.
19 U.S.C. § 3802(b)(3) (emphasis added).
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Thus, as one U.S. government attorney has put it,
Each of the United States’ post-NAFTA agreements embodies changes
that reflect the negotiating objectives . . . Many of these objectives, as well
as the resulting changes made to the agreements, have their origin in the
United States’ experience with NAFTA Chapter Eleven arbitration. In
broad terms, the significant changes include the clarification of standards
of certain substantive provisions, as well as modifications made to
promote the transparency of investor-State arbitration, improve the
efficiency of arbitrations, deter the filing of frivolous claims, and ensure
the consistency of interpretations of similar obligations across
agreements.77
It was in this context, therefore, that the U.S. negotiators proceeded with the negotiations
of the Singapore and Chile FTAs (the first two to use modified investment language), and
with CAFTA-DR.
B. CAFTA-DR’s Investor Protections
At the outset, several important distinctions between NAFTA and CAFTA-DR
affecting investment should be noted, even at the risk of stating the obvious. First, except
for the United States, the other CAFTA-DR parties are developing nations, with
relatively little investment in the United States, as is the case with most U.S. bilateral
investment treaties, despite their being fully reciprocal in the included rights and
obligations. There is thus likely to be relatively little investor-related litigation directed
at the United States. Secondly, all seven parties to the CAFTA-DR are also parties to the
ICSID Convention, while neither Canada nor Mexico have adhered.78 In practical terms,
this means that the normal ICSID Arbitration Rules79 and secretariat services are
available for investor-state disputes (in addition to other rules) while under NAFTA only
the ICSID Additional Facility Rules are available at ICSID.80
77

Andrea J. Menaker, Benefiting from Experience in the United States Most Recent Investment
Agreements, 12 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 121, 122 (2005) [hereinafter “Menaker”].
78
Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States,
Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, T.I.A.S. 6090, 575 U.N.T.S. 159; see ICSID, List of Contracting States
and Other Signatories (Jan. 2006), available at http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/constate/c-states-en.htm
(visited Aug. 1, 2006) (showing all the CAFTA-DR nations as members, but not Mexico or Canada)
[hereinafter “ICSID Convention”]. Canadian authorities signed the Convention on Dec. 19, 2006, but its
entry into force for Canada awaits enactment of implementing legislation in several Canadian Provinces.
Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada News Release, Canada Signs International Convention on
Investment Dispute Resolution, Dec. 19, 2006, available at
http://w01.international.gc.ca/minpub/Publication.aspx?isRedirect=True&publication_id=384696&Langua
ge=E&docnumber=160 (visited Dec. 22, 2006).
79
ICSID, Rules of Procedure for Arbitration (updated Apr. 10, 2006), available at
http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/basicdoc/partF.htm (visited Aug. 1, 2006).
80
The Additional Facility Rules are available to disputes where either the investor or the host state is an
ICSID party, but not both. They would be available for any disputes under NAFTA as between the U.S.
and Mexico or the U.S. and Canada, but not between Mexico and Canada. ICSID Additional Facility Rules
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Third, while U.S. firms (and Canadian firms) have in the past made significant
use of investor-state arbitration in the NAFTA context and otherwise, there is little
history of investor-state dispute settlement among the member countries of CAFTA-DR
other than the United States.81 Whether this is due to more significant efforts to resolve
disputes through negotiation, the high cost of international arbitration, relatively low
volumes of intra-Central American investment, cultural differences or some other factor
or factors is beyond the scope of this discussion.
Fourth, the text of Chapter 10, which is highly similar to the investment
provisions of earlier U.S. agreements, strongly suggests that Chapter 10 is essentially a
U.S. origin (rather than a jointly negotiated) document. The other six Parties’ input
appears limited primarily to the reservations and certain limitations in the party-specific
annexes, particularly with respect to sectors in which national treatment is not required
for foreign investors. As the USTR, “Summary of the Agreement” states, “Its [Chapter
10] provisions reflect traditional standards incorporated in early U.S. investment
agreements (including those in the North American Free Trade Agreement and U.S.
bilateral investment treaties) and in customary international law, and contain certain
innovations incorporated in the [U.S.] free trade agreements with Chile and Singapore as
well as others.”82 The basic text appears to have been imposed (with or without
objection) on the other negotiating parties.
Fifth, the NAFTA case law (and other investor-state case law) is relevant to
possible investor-state arbitrations under CAFTA-DR, despite that fact that “An award
made by a [CAFTA-DR] tribunal shall have no binding force except between the
disputing parties and in respect of the particular cases.”83 The issue is not “binding
force” or precedent, but whether tribunal members, likely experienced arbitrators from
one or more of the CAFTA-DR parties and/or from outside the region, will pay attention
to prior tribunal decisions on the same or similar issues, particularly when rendered under
legal provisions that are identical or closely similar. Experience under NAFTA has
demonstrated that tribunal members consider and discuss earlier arbitral decisions, even
if tribunal members don’t necessarily treat them as binding precedent. Even if the
tribunal members did not wish to do so, they usually have little choice, because both the
investor and the host state will cite prior decisions that tend to support their arguments
before the tribunal. In future investor-state arbitrations under CAFTA-DR, the parties

(updated Apr. 10, 2006), available at http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/facility/facility.htm (visited Aug. 1,
2006).
81
Of 106 completed and 104 pending ICSID and ICSID Additional Facility cases, only two have involved
a Central American country (Costa Rica, El Salvador), and none were between Central American-DR
nations and investors; see ICSID, List of Completed Cases, available at
http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/basicdoc/partF.htm ; ICSID, List of Completed Cases, available at
http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/pending.htm (both visited Aug. 1, 2006).
82
USTR, Summary of the [Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade] Agreement,
at 12 (undated), available at http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/pending.htm (visited Aug. 1, 2004)
(hereinafter “USTR Summary”) (emphasis added).
83
CAFTA-DR, art. 10.26.4.
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will likely refer the tribunals to prior NAFTA and to any other arbitral decisions that
involve the interpretation of similar treaty provisions.
1.

Coverage of Investments and Investors

As with NAFTA84, CAFTA-DR investment coverage is broad, applying to
“measures adopted or maintained by a Party relating to . . . investors of another party”
and to “covered investments,”85 the latter including “investments” defined broadly to
include an enterprise; shares of stock or other forms of equity participation; loan
instruments; futures, options and other derivatives; turnkey, construction, concession and
other contracts; intellectual property rights; licenses, authorizations and permits issued
under domestic law; and various tangible, intangible, movable or immovable property,
and related property rights.86 However, not all transactions taking one of these forms will
be covered “investments.” Among other things, the investment must have “the
characteristics of an investment, including such characteristics as the commitment of
capital or other resources, the expectation of gain or profit, or the assumption of risk.”87
Claims with regard to sovereign debt instruments are covered, but if the claim
relates to a short term instrument (less than one year) the claim cannot be filed until more
than one year from the date of events (e.g., default) on which the claim is based.88 An
order or judgment from a court or administrative tribunal is not an investment.89 Not only
direct governmental actions but actions by state enterprises and others exercising
regulatory or administrative authority are covered.90 Except with regard to performance
requirements and investment and environment,91 Chapter 10 is not applicable to an “act
or fact . . . or any situation that ceased to exist before the date of entry into force of this
Agreement.”92 This language presumably establishes a basic rule of non-retroactivity,
but would not bar a claim based on a course of conduct by a party violating the Section A
obligations that began before entry into force but continued afterward.
The definition of “investor of a Party” is also broad. It includes “a Party or state
enterprise thereof, or a national or an enterprise of a Party, that attempts to make, is
making, or has made an investment in the territory of another Party.”93 (The state
enterprise is apparently covered only when it exercises regulatory, administrative or other
84
Many BITs also define investment broadly, and ICSID tribunals, despite the requirement in Article 25(1)
of the ICSID Convention that a dispute must involve an investment, have tended to take an expansive view
of the concept. See Emilio Vinuesa, Bilateral Investment Treaties and the Settlement of Investment
Disputes Under ICSID: The Latin American Experience, 8 FALL L. & Bus. Rev. Am. 501, 513-516 (2002)
(discussing the treatment of a dispute involving purchase of certain debt instruments as a dispute over an
investment).
85
CAFTA-DR, art. 10.1.1.
86
Id., art. 10.28.
87
Ibid.
88
Id., annex 10-E, para. 3.
89
Id., art. 10.28, n. 11.
90
Id., art. 10.1.2.
91
Id., arts. 10.9, 10.11.
92
Id., art. 10.1.3.
93
Id., art. 10.28.
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governmental authority that has been delegated to it by the government.94) However,
unlike many bilateral investment treaties, CAFTA-DR deals explicitly with the dual
national problem, since the benefits of Chapter 10 are available to “investors of another
party . . .” 95 that is, the benefits are not available to Party’s own national for an
investment in its own territory. Consequently, Chapter 10 provides that a natural person
claiming jurisdiction under the Agreement “shall be deemed to be exclusively a national
of the State of his or her dominant and effective nationality.”96 This effectively codifies
the general principle of international law applicable to dual nationals.97
Consistent with this approach, the Agreement also permits a Party to deny
Chapter 10 benefits to companies nominally operating in another Party, if the owners
have no substantial business activities within CAFTA-DR other than in the Party denying
the benefits, and persons of a non-Party, or of the denying Party, are the owners of the
enterprise.98 This language deals with two different situations. First, it has presumably
been intended at least in part to preclude nationals of one CAFTA-DR Party (e.g.,
Guatemala) from using a corporation formed in the United States (without substantial
business activities there) from seeking the benefits of protection under Chapter 10 for
their investments in Guatemala. Secondly, if, for example, a Korean firm sets up a
corporate subsidiary in Nicaragua, but has no substantial business activities in
Nicaragua, the Nicaraguan subsidiary lacks standing to bring a Chapter 10 action against
the United States based on the Korean firm’s investment in the United States.
CAFTA-DR, like NAFTA, also prevents the Parties from having to offer Section A
benefits to nationals of nations with which the offering Party does not have diplomatic
relations or where rules and regulations on prohibited transactions would be violated.99
This is presumably designed to prevent a Cuban-owned enterprise in one of the CAFTADR from enforcing Chapter 10 rights against the United States.
The provisions of Chapter 10 prevail against inconsistent provisions in other
chapters generally, but do not apply with regard to government measures that may also be
covered by the financial services chapter (12).100
2.

National Treatment and MFN Treatment

The key protections in most investment protection agreements are those relating
to national treatment, most favored nation treatment, fair and equitable treatment and
expropriation, and these provisions of NAFTA are those that have been subject to the

94

Id., art. 10.1.2.
Id., art. 10.1.1(a).
96
Id., referring to annex 2.1.
97
See RUDOLF DOLZER & MARGRETE STEVENS, BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES 34 (Martinus Nijhoff,
1995)
98
Id., art. 10.12.2.
99
Id., art. 10.12.1.
100
Id., art. 10.2.
95
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greatest volume of litigation.101 The concept of national treatment, as reflected in
CAFTA-DR Article 10.3, is simple in theory:
Each Party shall accord to investors of another Party treatment no less
favorable than that it accords, in like circumstances, to its own investors
with respect to the establishment, acquisition, expansion, management,
conduct, operation, and sale or other disposition of investments in its
territory.
Applying such a non-discrimination principle is not always easy in practice.
Among the issues that have arisen under NAFTA are what constitutes “in like
circumstances” and whether there must be evidence of intent to discriminate, with the key
decisions being Pope & Talbot v. Canada102 and S.D. Myers.103 The former related to a
dispute over treatment of export quotas under a U.S. – Canada agreement, and resulted in
a determination that the national treatment provisions of NAFTA were not violated, on
the ground that different classes of lumber producers and exporters that were actually in
like circumstances were not treated differently. The latter turned on Canadian
government regulations which effectively precluded the export of hazardous wastes for
processing in the United States so as to assure that Canadian wastes would be processed
by a Canadian firm in Alberta; a violation of Article 1102 (national treatment) was found.
In another case, Feldman v. Mexico,104 a tribunal decided that foreign and domestic
cigarette resellers were in like circumstances, but not foreign resellers and domestic
cigarette manufacturers.
Most favored nation treatment, in NAFTA and in CAFTA-DR, is designed to
assure that investors of one party are not treated in a discriminatory manner with regard
to investors of another treaty party, or investors with rights under a separate investment
treaty with the host government. The CAFTA-DR language, virtually identical to that in
NAFTA, provides:
Each Party shall accord to investors [covered investments] of another
Party treatment no less favorable than that it accords, in like
circumstances, to investors of any other Party or of any non-Party with
respect to the establishment, acquisition, expansion, management,
101

NAFTA, arts. 1102, 1103, 1105, 1110.
Pope & Talbot v. Canada, Award on the Merits of Phase Two (Apr. 10, 2001), available at
http://www.naftaclaims.com (visited Aug. 1, 2006) [the third major Pope & Talbot decision, addressing
national treatment and fair and equitable treatment, hereinafter “Pope & Talbot III”].
103
S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Government of Canada (Nov. 13, 2000) (Partial Award) [hereinafter S.D. Myers],
40 I.L.M. 1408 (2001); see also Cross-Border Trucking Services, Feb. 6, 2001, paras. 248, 249, available
at http://www.nafta-secalena.org/app/DocRepository/1/Dispute/english/NAFTA_Chapter_20/USA/ub98010e.pdf (visited Aug. 1,
2006) (a Chapter 20 dispute interpreting identical language in art. 1202 regarding services). The author
served as one of the panelists.
104
Marvin Feldman v. United Mexican States, Case no. ARB(AF)/99/1 (Dec. 16, 2002), 42 I.L.M. 625
(2003) [hereinafter Feldman], available at http://www.naftaclaims.com (visited Aug. 1, 2006). The
author served as one of the members of the tribunal.
102
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conduct, operation, and sale or other disposition of investments in its
territory.105
This language has not been tested extensively under the NAFTA
investment provisions, but was applied by a Chapter 20 NAFTA tribunal in the
Cross Border Trucking Services case, in which Mexico had claimed that the
United States was violating NAFTA’s most favored nation investment (and
services) clauses by permitting Canadian investment in U.S. trucking firms while
denying Mexican investors the same opportunities.106 It may well be that under
an agreement with seven states-Party instead of only three that most-favorednation issues will arise more frequently than they have under NAFTA,
particularly for any CAFTA-DR Parties that have an extensive network of
bilateral investment treaties, so that an investor can seek the applications of more
favorable provisions (if any) in alternative treaties through the MFN clause in
Chapter 10.107
3.

Minimum Standard of Treatment

Among the most complex obligations under Section A of the investment
chapter is the obligation to provide a minimum standard of treatment, particularly
fair and equitable treatment, to foreign investors. The concept here is again
relatively simple. What if the host state treats both foreign investors and its own
citizens in an arbitrary and unreasonable manner? This would not violate a
national treatment standard, but it would fall afoul of a fair and equitable
treatment requirement. Full protection and security, in recent U.S. treaty practice
at least, refers largely to police protection in the event of mob violence and the
like. CAFTA-DR provides:
Each Party shall accord to covered investments treatment in accordance
with customary international law, including fair and equitable treatment
and full protection and security.108
This language is substantively identical to NAFTA, except that NAFTA does not
include the term “customary” before “international law.”109 However, the NAFTA
Parties attempted to eliminate the confusion as to the extent to which “customary
international law” meant something different (and more narrow) from “international law”
alone, by issuing a binding “Interpretation” of NAFTA Chapter 11,110 along with the
105

CAFTA-DR, art. 10.4.1.
Cross Border Trucking Services, supra note 103, para. 297.
107
There is an ongoing discussion regarding whether jurisprudence regarding MFN principles governing
trade (e.g., GATT, Article I) should be applicable when MFN issues are raised under investment treaty
provisions, as with CAFTA-DR, art. 10.5.
108
CAFTA-DR, art. 10.5.1.
109
NAFTA, art. 1105(1).
110
NAFTA, art. 1131(2) provides that “An interpretation by the [Free Trade] Commission of a provision
of this Agreement shall be binding on a Tribunal established under this Section.” CAFTA-DR, art. 10.23.2
incorporates similar language.
106
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language that stated, inter alia, that “The concepts of ‘fair and equitable treatment’ and
‘full protection and security’ do not require treatment in addition to or beyond that which
is required by the customary international law minimum standard of treatment of
aliens.”111 A full discussion of the proper scope of fair and equitable treatment and what
constitutes the minimum standard of treatment under customary international law is well
beyond the scope of this article.112 However, it is noted here that the Interpretation was
designed in part to counteract one of the early Pope & Talbot decisions, in which the
tribunal unwisely decided that the NAFTA fair and equitable treatment was in addition to
what was required under international law.113
Thus, for subsequent FTAs, including CAFTA-DR, the United States negotiators
apparently decided to make it more difficult for tribunals to make mischief with fair and
equitable treatment. Accordingly, CAFTA-DR “for greater certainty” contains more
specific definitions and limitations. First,
The concepts of ‘fair and equitable treatment’ and ‘full protection and
security’ do not require treatment in addition to or beyond that which is
required by that [customary international law minimum] standard, and do
not create additional substantive rights.114
Secondly,
“fair and equitable treatment” includes the obligation not to deny justice115
in criminal, civil or administrative adjudicatory proceedings in accordance
with the principle of due process embodied in the principal legal systems
of the world . . . .116
This language also reflects NAFTA experience, and a perceived need to instruct
future tribunals on how to deal with situations in which the tribunal is effectively
reviewing a national court or administrative decision for consistency with
CAFTA-DR Chapter 10. Denial of justice has been addressed in at least two

111

See Notes of Interpretation of Certain Chapter 11 Provisions, (Jul. 31, 2001), available at
<http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/tna-nac/NAFTA-Interpr-en.asp?format=print> (visited Mar. 31, 2003).
112
See, e.g., Ian A. Laird, Betrayal, Shock and Outrage—Recent Developments in NAFTA Article 1105, in
NAFTA—INVESTMENT LAW AND ARBITRATION: PAST ISSUES, CURRENT PRACTICE, FUTURE PROSPECTS
49-76 (Todd Weiler, ed., Transnational Publ. 2004); Gantz – Evolution, supra note 46, at 708-730.
113
Pope & Talbot III, supra note 102, paras. 114-115. A fuller discussion of fair and equitable treatment
in Pope & Talbot can be found in David A. Gantz, International Decisions: Pope & Talbot, Inc. v.
Canada, 97 Am. J. Int’l L. 937, 942-947 (2003).
114
CAFTA-DR, art. 10.5.2.
115
“Denial of justice exists when there is a denial, unwarranted delay or obstruction of access to courts,
gross deficiency in the administration of judicial or remedial process, failure to provide those guarantees
which are generally considered indispensable to the proper administration of justice, or a manifestly unjust
judgment. An error of a national court which does not produce manifest injustice is not a denial of justice.”
Harvard Research draft, art. 9, quoted in IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 506507 (6th ed., Oxford, 2003).
116
CAFTA-DR, art. 10.5.2(a).
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NAFTA decisions, Loewen, Mondev Int’l Ltd. v. United States117 and Waste
Management v. Mexico,118although no clear standard has yet been articulated in
the NAFTA jurisprudence. 119
Thirdly, the CAFTA-DR parties decided to define customary international law:
The Parties confirm their shared understanding that “customary
international law” generally . . . results from a general and consistent
practice of States that they follow from a sense of legal obligation. With
regard to Article 10.5 [minimum standard of treatment] , the customary
international law minimum standard of treatment of aliens refers to all
customary international law principles that protect the economic rights and
interests of aliens.120
These particular clarifications reflect U.S. Trade Promotion Authority language, quoted
at length above, which effectively requires that standards “for fair and equitable treatment
[be] consistent with United States legal principles and practice, including the principle of
due process.”121 As one U.S. government attorney has asserted, “These clarifications do
not change the nature of the substantive obligations . . . instead, they merely elucidate, for
the benefit of tribunals charged with interpreting the treaty, the Parties’ intent in agreeing
to those obligations.”122 However, they also seem designed to narrow the choices for
members of future tribunals, despite the fact that a tribunal such as the one in Loewen
would still have to decide the requirements of a denial of justice under customary
international law, or a tribunal such as that in Pope & Talbot what constituted the
minimum standard required under international law for fair and equitable treatment, and
how to determine what standard is actually revealed from state practice. Whether it will
discourage arbitrators from looking at other sources of international law123 in determining
that standard, such as earlier arbitral decisions and any of the several thousand bilateral
117

(Award) (Oct. 11, 2002), 42 I.L.M. 85 (2003) [hereinafter “Mondev”]
(Award) (Apr. 30, 2004), 33 I.L.M. 967 (2004) [hereinafter “Waste Management II”]
119
See Andrea K. Bjorklund, Reconciling State Sovereignty and Investor Protection in Denial of Justice
Claims, 45 VA. J. INT’L L. 809, 849-860 (2005) (discussing the tribunals’ treatment of denial of justice and
concluding that “The Tribunals have not, however entirely agreed on the progress made in the intervening
seventy-five years [since the Mexican General Claims Commission cases], and they have not announced
appreciably clearer or more useful standards.”).
120
CAFTA-DR, annex 10-B.
121
19 U.S.C. § 3802(b)(3)(E) (2002); see Part III(A), supra.
122
Menaker, supra note 77, at 122.
123
Art. 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, Jun. 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, T.S. no. 993, 3
Bevans 1179, established a hierarchy of sources of international law: international conventions;
international custom; general principles of law recognized by civilized nations; judicial decisions and the
teachings of publicists (“as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law.” Some, such as expert
NAFTA Chapter 11 attorney Todd Weiler, argue that this additional language (whether in the NAFTA
Interpretation or in CAFTA-DR) simply defines the standard as customary international law, leaving the
question of the substance of the obligation as applied by tribunals in particular cases, subject to being
informed by treaty, custom and/or general principles of international law. (Email correspondence with
Todd Weiler, Sep. 18, 2006, on file with author).
118
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investment treaties in force (or even U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence), remains to be
seen.
4.

Direct and Indirect Expropriation

Expropriation is probably the single most complex and politically-sensitive area
in investment treaties, as suggested in the earlier discussion of regulatory takings and the
5th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. For all the discussion and commotion, there has
been only one tribunal decision under NAFTA that resulted in a finding of expropriation,
Metalclad v. United Mexican States,124 and despite the rather weak reasoning of the
tribunal, Metalclad was arguably a “garden variety” expropriation, where Metalclad was
deprived of the use and enjoyment of its hazardous waste disposal facility by state
authorities, purportedly to create an “ecological preserve.”125 Indirect or “creeping”
expropriations are covered by NAFTA as well as by CAFTA-DR, yet to date none has
been found; Methanex, noted earlier, is the only decision to date where conceivably that
result might have occurred.
However, notwithstanding that case history, the broad expropriation language of
both agreements, by itself, would suggest that the critics are not paranoid. The basic
language of CAFTA-DR is instructive:
No Party may expropriate or nationalize a covered investment either
directly or indirectly through measures equivalent to expropriation or
nationalization (“expropriation”), except:
(a) for a public purpose;
(b) in a non-discriminatory manner;
(c) on payment of prompt, adequate and effective compensation in accordance
with paras. 2 through 4126; and
(d) in accordance with due process of law and Article 10.5.127
This language differs somewhat from NAFTA, but primarily in non-substantive
respects. NAFTA also covered both direct and indirect expropriation, but contained a
confusing term “tantamount to expropriation” which now reads “equivalent to
expropriation,” generally following the interpretation of the term endorsed by the tribunal
in S.D. Myers.128 The language does not really deal with the key problem, which is
deciding what constitutes an indirect expropriation. Most actual or alleged expropriations
in recent years, and certainly those in the NAFTA and Central American countries, are
not situations in which the army marches into a foreign owned facility and seizes it.129
124

Metalclad Corporation v. United Mexican States, Case no. ARB(AF)/97/1 (Aug. 26, 2000), 40 I.L.M.
36 (2001) [hereinafter Metalclad].
125
Id., 40 I.L.M. at 44.
126
Paras. 2-4 require payment without delay based on the fair market value of the investment, fully
realizable and fully transferable in convertible currency or at a fair rate of conversion, plus interest.
127
CAFTA-DR, art. 10.7.1.
128
S.D. Myers, supra note 103, 40 I.L.M. at 1440.
129
This has happened most recently in Bolivia, when soldiers were ordered to occupy the natural gas
fields in May 2006. Notisur South American Political and Economic Affairs, Bolivia: President Evo
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Rather, they are indirect takings, sometimes called “creeping” expropriations, where one
or more government actions accidentally or intentionally make it impossible for a foreign
investor to continue to operate.
Nor are the four conditions a great deal of assistance, since they kick in only after
the existence of an expropriation has been found under the “chapeau.” Moreover, as long
as fair compensation is required in any event, it doesn’t really much difference in the
final analysis whether the expropriation meets the other three standards. A sovereign
government traditionally can nationalize pretty much without second-guessing as long as
it pays fair compensation, and tribunals seem loath to decide whether a particular action
is for a public purpose. However, under both NAFTA and CAFTA-DR, tribunals might
be more likely to order restitution of the property seized by the expropriating government
in an “illegal” expropriation, although even there the expropriating government has the
option of paying monetary damages.130
CAFTA-DR does, however, expand on the NAFTA expropriation language in
several important respects, which may well make it somewhat more difficult for
claimants to convince tribunals to find indirect expropriations or actions equivalent to
expropriations which that would otherwise require compensation:
The Parties confirm their shared understanding that:
1. Article 10.7.1 is intended to reflect customary international law
concerning the obligation of States with respect to expropriation.
2. An action or a series of actions by a Party cannot constitute an
expropriation unless it interferes with a tangible or intangible property
right or property interest in an investment.
3. Article 10.7.1 addresses two situations. The first is direct expropriation,
where an investment is nationalized or otherwise directly expropriated
through formal transfer of title or outright seizure.
4. The second situation addressed by Article 10.7.1 is indirect
expropriation, where an action or series of actions by a Party has an effect
equivalent to direct expropriation without formal transfer of title or
outright seizure.
(a) The determination of whether an action or series of actions by a Party,
in a specific fact situation, constitutes an indirect expropriation, requires a
case-by case, fact-based inquiry that considers, among other factors:
(i) the economic impact of the government action, although the fact
that an action or series of actions by a Party has an adverse effect on the
economic value of an investment, standing alone, does not establish that
an indirect expropriation has occurred;

Morales Nationalizes Natural Gas Resources, May 12, 2006, 2006 WLNR 8238298. See also David A.
Gantz, The Marcona Settlement: New Forms of Negotiation and Compensation for Nationalized Property,
71 Am. J. Int. L. 474 (1977) (discussing the takeover, in 1975, by the Peruvian army of an American
company’s iron ore mine and smelter, and the compensation negotiations that followed).
130
NAFTA, art. 1135.1(b); CAFTA-DR, art. 10.26:1(b).
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(ii) the extent to which the government action interferes with
distinct, reasonable investment-backed expectations; and
(iii) the character of the government action.
(b) Except in rare circumstances, nondiscriminatory regulatory actions by
a Party that are designed and applied to protect legitimate public welfare
objectives, such as public health, safety, and the environment, do not
constitute indirect expropriations.131
Some of these are significant changes, some not, but all affect the ticklish
determination of what actions may constitute an indirect expropriation.132 Paragraph 1,
relating to customary international law, reflects concepts already discussed. Paragraph 2
seeks to limit expropriations to property rights. What is not a property right that the
United States wishes to exclude from coverage? Perhaps this is intended to clarify that
market access alone is not a property, right, or partially reflects Methanex, noted earlier,
where the company was allegedly deprived of its opportunity to sell methane because its
customers in California could no longer produce MTBE? Perhaps also the objective is
distinguishing the rights “related to” to investments from cases based primarily on trading
activities rather than on investment per se, as with Ethyl133, Pope & Talbot, S.D. Myers
and Feldman.
Paragraph 3 provides a specific, but non-controversial, definition of direct
expropriation. Paragraph 4 is the thorny issue of defining what constitutes an indirect
expropriation or taking, and reflects U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence, specifically the
Penn Central approach.134 Paragraph 4(a) directs a case-by-case approach, focusing on a
non-exclusive series of considerations, including the economic impact of the government
on the investor, the investor’s reasonable expectations, and the character of the
government action. (Presumably, this goes to some extent to motive, and to whether the
government was seeking to force an investor out of business or has other, less suspect
objectives.)
The most significant part is likely para. 4(b), which establishes a presumption that
a group of regulatory actions designed to protect legitimate public welfare objectives
(including but not limited to those enumerated) will be excluded from treatment as a
compensable indirect expropriation. However, the language, again reflecting Penn
Central, does not require the “appropriation” of the property, only that the effect of the
government action constitute an expropriation. What impact this will have is difficult to
131

CAFTA-DR, annex 10-C; emphasis added.
See Menaker, supra note 77, at 123 (explaining that “the annex [to post NAFTA investment
provisions] sets forth a number of factors that tribunals should take into consideration when determining
whether an indirect expropriation has occurred”).
133
Ethyl Corp. v. Canada (Award on Jurisdiction), Jun. 24, 1998, 38 ILM 708 (1999). Once the tribunal
found jurisdiction, and the federal government lost an international Canadian arbitration, the Canadian
government effectively terminated the administrative action that had resulted in a ban on Ethyl’s sale in
Canada of a gasoline additive manufactured in the United States. See Alan C. Swan, International
Decision: Ethyl Corp. v. Canada, Award on Jurisdiction, 94 Am. J. Int'l L. 159 (2000) (discussing the case
and its nature as a trade rather than an investment dispute).
134
Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 130-138) (1978).
132
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assess unless and until there are tribunal actions under CAFTA-DR, the Chile and
Singapore FTAs or others with this language. Some, including this author, have
expressed the concern that excluding a broad class of regulatory actions from treatment
as an expropriation would be an invitation to clever, if unscrupulous, government
officials to craft a regulation non-discriminatory on its face but nevertheless designed or
applied in such a manner to put a certain foreign company or group of companies out of
business, and at minimum would raise the burden of proof for foreign claimants arguing
that regulatory actions were in fact expropriatory.135 Perhaps the “except in rare
circumstances” language with give the tribunals a reasonable opportunity to treat
government actions otherwise fitting the exception as expropriatory nevertheless, as the
U.S. Supreme Court did in Lucas.136
5.

Performance Requirements

The performance requirements section of CAFTA-DR gives foreign investors
somewhat greater specificity than the WTO’s TRIMS Agreement,137 by providing a more
expansive list of what constitutes banned performance requirements, but it also includes a
series of exceptions, for example, for TRIPS compliance and where GATT Article XX
exceptions for “compliance with laws and regulations that are not inconsistent with this
Agreement” and for measures (including environmental measures) “necessary to protect
human, animal or plant life or health” or “related to the conservation of living or nonliving exhaustible natural resources.”138 Also, unlike TRIMS Chapter 10 effectively
provides a private right of (investor) action, unlike the WTO system. Performance
requirements have not been a major issue in NAFTA litigation; although a claim was
made in both Pope & Talbot and in S.D. Myers, the tribunal rejected it in both
instances.139 Article 10.9 bars the usual tie-ins—exporting a given level of goods or
services produced, maintaining a given level of domestic content, relating import volume
or value to exports or to the availability of foreign exchange, limiting sales based on
export volume, technology transfer requirements and exclusive supply arrangements.
None of these requirements may be imposed, “in connection with the establishment,
acquisition, expansion, management, conduct, operation, or sale or other disposition of an
investment of an investor of a Party or of a non-Party in its territory . . . .” 140
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Gantz, Evolution, supra note 46, at 764-765.
See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027-1032 (1992) (where a majority of
the court determined that a state regulation of beachfront property, depriving the claimant of essentially all
productive use of his property, constituted a compensable taking).
137
Agreement on Trade Related Investment Measures, Annex 1a to the Marrakech Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 14, 1994, available at
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/18-trims.doc (visited Aug. 1, 2006).
138
CAFTA-DR, art. 10.9; See GATT, art. XX(b), (d), (g), TRIMS, art. 3 (the latter incorporating all
GATT exceptions into TRIMS).
139
Pope & Talbot v. Canada (Interim Award) (Jun. 26, 2000), 40 ILM 258 (2001) [expropriation issues,
merits], hereinafter Pope & Talbot II, paras. 73, 75, 76, available at http://www.naftaclaims.com (visited
Aug. 1, 2006); S.D. Myers v. Canada, supra note 103, 40 I.L.M. at 1439-1440.
140
CAFTA-DR, art. 10.9.1.
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Similarly, the receipt of government benefits or advantages may not be
conditioned on achieving domestic content, local purchase or export requirements.141
There are exceptions for intellectual property rights when the Party is in compliance with
the WTO TRIPs Agreement; or enforcing its anti-competition laws; or, if nondiscriminatory measures are imposed which are necessary to secure compliance with
laws and regulations otherwise consistent with the Agreement, or to protect human,
animal or plant life and health or related to conservation of living or non-living
exhaustible natural resources.142 These later two provisions, including the “necessary”
terminology, closely track GATT 1994, Article XX, and may well be implemented in a
similarly narrow manner, including the limitation of “necessary” to permitting certain
measures where no less trade restrictive measure is available.143 Of course, one should
not assume that NAFTA arbitrators will necessarily follow the GATT jurisprudence in
interpreting these CAFTA-DR provisions.
6.

Investment, Labor and the Environment

CAFTA-DR contains an environmentally friendly sounding exception, investment
and the environment:
Nothing in this Chapter shall be construed to prevent a Party from
adopting, maintaining, or enforcing any measure otherwise consistent with
this Chapter that it considers appropriate to ensure that investment activity
in its territory is undertaken in a manner sensitive to environmental
concerns.144
In the NAFTA context identical language145 has had essentially no significance; it
was mentioned, but dismissed in S.D. Myers.146 The provision was circular: the
environment could be protected, but enforcement had to be “otherwise consistent with
this agreement.” However, as noted earlier, in NAFTA there is no presumption against
treating environmental regulatory actions as indirect expropriation. Arguably, the same
language in CAFTA-DR could have a more substantive impact, as it may be cited to
reinforce the presumption in Annex 10-C(4)(b) that environmental regulation is not
normally to be considered to be a compensable taking.

141

Id., art. 10.9.2.
Id., art. 10.9.3(b)-(c).
143
GATT art. XX(b) and XX(g); see Korea – Various Measures on Beef, WT/DS161/AB/R, adopted
Jan. 10, 2001, paras. 161-162, available at http://www.wto.org (visited Aug. 15, 2006) (“necessary” means
something close to “indispensable”, not simply “making a contribution to”).
144
CAFTA-DR, art. 10.11.
145
NAFTA, art. 1114(a).
146
See S.D. Myers, supra note 103, separate opinion of Dr. Brian Schwartz, 40 I.L.M. at 1461-1462
(characterizing Article 1114 of NAFTA “as acknowledging and reminding interpreters of chapter 11
(investment_ that the parties take both the environment and open trade various seriously ad that means
should be found to reconcile these two objectives….”).
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NAFTA reflected concerns on the part of some in the United States that lax labor
or environmental regulation would be used as means of attracting investment to Mexico,
and attempted to discourage this by stating that
The Parties recognizes that it is inappropriate to encourage investment by
relaxing domestic health, safety or environmental measures. Accordingly,
a Party should not waive or otherwise derogate from, or offer to waive or
otherwise derogate from, such measures as an encouragement for the
establishment acquisition, expansion or retention in its territory of an
investment of an investor. 147
NAFTA also provided for consultations in the event of possible violations. Even if this
language were somehow relating to the later-drafted North American Agreement on
Labor Cooperation,148
CAFTA-DR contains the identical first sentence in both the labor and the
environmental chapters, but is somewhat weaker on the follow-up, whereby the Party is
to “strive to ensure that it does not waive or otherwise derogate from . . . .”149 CAFTADR also lacks the explicit right of consultation.
7.

Miscellaneous Provisions

Other provisions in section A cover such matters as investor interests in the case
of armed conflict and civil strife,150 a provision that does not appear in NAFTA although
perhaps it could be incorporated on the basis of NAFTA’s MFN clause applicable to state
obligations to foreign investors, Article 1103. IN CAFTA-DR, the Parties are to “accord
to investors of another Party, and to covered investments, non-discriminatory treatment
with regard to measures it adopts or maintains relating to losses suffered by investments
in its territory owing to armed conflict or civil strife”; if the investor’s property is
requisitioned or destroyed by government forces to an extent not required by the
“necessity of the situation,” compensation is required.151 Guatemala has taken a
reservation to the latter.152
Funds transfers; performance requirements; and choice of senior management,
among others, are also covered. All of these last three are adapted with minor
modifications from the parallel NAFTA provisions. The transfer provisions of CAFTADR cover the range of possible income sources, including capital contributions, profits,
dividends, capital gains, interest, royalty payments and those arising out of a dispute.153
The transfers must be available freely and without delay, in a freely usable currency, and
147

NAFTA, art. 1114(b).
North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation, NAALC, Sep. 12, 1992, available at
http://www.naalc.org/english/agreement.shtml (visited Nov. 20, 2006).
149
CAFTA-DR, arts. 16.2.2, 17.2.2; Italics added.
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Id.,, art. 10.6.
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include returns in kind when covered by an agreement.154 Exceptions are preserved for
bankruptcy, insolvency, securities dealings, criminal offenses, financial reporting or
records needed for law enforcement, and compliance with judgments.155
CAFTA-DR, like NAFTA, investors, retain the discretion to chose senior
management and boards of directors without regard to nationality, but also without
precluding normal national requirements that a majority of the board of directors be of
the host country’s nationality, unless that rule unless that requirement were to “materially
impair the ability of the investor to exercise control over its investment.”156
8.

Exceptions and Reservations for Non-Conforming Measures

Finally, there is an exception in Chapter 10 for non-conforming measures. These
provisions preserve the Parties’ rights to protect existing non-conforming measures at the
central government, regional or local government level when those measures are set out
in a Party’s Annex I (existing non-conforming measures that are preserved).157 However,
they apply only to certain Section A benefits, national treatment, most favored nation
treatment, performance requirements and senior management. They do not free annex or
non-conforming measures from the obligations relating to minimum standard of
treatment or expropriation, among others. The section also bars new laws covered by the
Party’s Annex II (permitting existing and new non-conforming restrictions), from forcing
an investor to dispose of his investment based on the investor’s nationality.158
These reservations in Annexes I and II of CAFTA-DR are extensive in many
instances, and are set out on a country by country basis. For example, in Costa Rica’s
Annex I, under “Cross Border Services and Investment” the following reservation
appears:
A concession is required to perform any type of development or
activity in the maritime-terrestrial zone [200 meter strip along the entire
coastline]. Such a concession shall not be granted to or held by: (a) foreign
nationals that have not resided in the country for at least five years; (b)
enterprises with bearer shares; (c) enterprises domiciled abroad; (d)
enterprises incorporated in the country solely by foreign nationals; or (e)
enterprises where more than 50 percent of the capital shares or
stocks are owned by foreigners.
Within the maritime-terrestrial zone, no concession may be granted within
the first 50 meters counted from the high tide line nor in the area
comprised between the high tide line and the low tide line.159
154
155
156
157
158
159

Id., art. 10.8.1-3.
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As is obvious, this proviso discriminates against foreigners with respect to Article
10.3 national treatment and might be subject to challenge as well under Article 10.5
(minimum standard of treatment), in the absence of its status as a reserved nonconforming measure. (Even so, Annex I does not override the “fair and equitable
treatment” rights of investors.) Costa Rica is not of course alone. In Annex I, U.S.
reservations cover, inter alia, atomic energy; mining; air transportation; and radio
communications. These restrictions are not necessarily outright bans on foreign
investment, but they typically restrict foreign investment in the enumerated sectors.160
IV.

Investor-State Dispute Settlement

In addition to a series of investor rights, CAFTA-DR, like all U.S. BITs and most
U.S. FTAs,161 contains provisions for mandatory international arbitration of investor-state
disputes. Substantively, there are relatively few major differences between the
mechanisms set forth in CAFTA-DR and those in NAFTA. Certain procedural
modifications have been made, and provisions relating to transparency of the arbitral
proceedings based on several NAFTA Commission decisions, have been incorporated
into the text of CAFTA-DR. Both agreements follow now-traditional procedures first
developed in international commercial arbitration with regard to such matters as
consultations, choice of arbitrators, procedural due process and the like. However,
despite certain CAFTA-DR specific requirements, most of the procedural aspects of
investor-state arbitration are governed by the arbitration rules chosen by the disputing
parties, either those of ICSID162 or of the United Nations Commission on International
Trade Law.163
If non-binding consultations and negotiations164 are unsuccessful in resolving the
dispute the claimant, either on her own behalf or on behalf of an enterprise (a legal entity)
controlled by the claimant, may lodge a claim that the responding Party has breached one
of its obligations under Section A.165 However, in a significant addition to the coverage
provided in NAFTA, Chapter 11, claims may also be brought for breach of an
“investment authorization” or “investment agreement.”166 An “investment authorization”
is defined as “an authorization that the foreign investment authority of a Party grants to a
covered investment of an investor of another party . . . .” 167 (The United States of course
160

Id., annex I (United States), passim.
Except, as noted earlier, the Australia and Jordan FTAs.
162
See ICSID Arbitration Rules, supra note 79.
163
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules (1976), UNGA Res. 31/98, available at
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/arb-rules/arb-rules.pdf (visited Aug. 2, 2006).
CAFTA-DR, art. 10.16.5, states that “The arbitration rules applicable under paragraph 3, and in effect on
the date the claim or claims were submitted to arbitration under this Section, shall govern the arbitration
except to extent modified by this Agreement.”
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Id., art. 10.15.
165
Id., art. 10.16(1).
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Ibid.
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Id., art. 10.28.
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has no such authority as the term is used here, so that this protection is meaningless for
foreign investment into the United States.)
“Investment agreement” means a
written agreement that takes effect on or after the date of entry into force
of this Agreement between a national authority of a Party and a covered
investment or an investor of another Party that grants the covered
investment or investor rights: (a) with respect to natural resources or other
assets that a national authority controls; and (b) upon which the covered
investment or the investor relies in establishing or acquiring a covered
investment other than the written agreement itself . . . .168
The right of an investor to challenge not only a violation of international law as
embodied in the protections of Section A, but also a breach of an investment
authorization or agreement, could significantly increase the potential scope of jurisdiction
of investor-state dispute settlement, particularly in countries where the requirement of
formal government approval of certain investments is a common practice. Reliance on
government approvals also becomes an explicit factor in determining jurisdiction over a
state. Without this language, a breach of an investment authorization or agreement could
not be challenged unless it also constituted a breach of a Section A obligation.
The Advisory Committee for Trade Policy and Negotiations, reviewing CAFTADR, was particularly impressed by these additions: “The Committee stresses the
importance of covering both investment authorizations and agreements, and cannot urge
strongly enough that these provisions must be part of all future agreements.”169
A.

Notice, Choice of Forum and Consent

CAFTA-DR contains several notice requirements. First, at least 90 days before a
claim can be submitted to arbitration, a “notice of intention to submit a claim to
arbitration” must be filed with the respondent state. The claimant is required to specify,
in addition to names and addresses, the particular provisions of Section A or of the
investment authorization or investment agreement for which a breach is claimed; the
“legal and factual basis for each claim”; as well as the relief sought and the approximate
damages claimed.170 This requires something more than simple “notice” pleading, given
the language about the legal and factual basis for each claim. With the similarity of this
language to NAFTA,171 claimants under CAFTA-DR can draw on the NAFTA practice,

168

Ibid. “National authority” means the authority of the central government only, not that of any state or
local entity, per art. 10.28, fn. 13.
169
U.S. Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA): Report of the Advisory Committee for Trade
Policy and Negotiations (ACTPN), Mar. 12, 2004, at 5, available at
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/CAFTA/CAFTA_Reports/asset_upload_file367_5
932.pdf (visited Aug. 2, 2006).
170
CAFTA-DR, art. 10.16.2.
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NAFTA, art. 1119.
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in which the notice of intent is typically 10 - 15 pages,172 and it is probably reasonable
to assume that the CAFTA-DR Free Trade Commission173 will eventually issue
guidelines for such notices, as has occurred in NAFTA.174 While this NAFTA document
is effectively a recommendation and thus not binding on claimants, it does state that if the
form is properly completed it “will satisfy the requirement of Article 1119.”175
The more important notice is, of course, the notice of arbitration, which cannot be
filed until “six months have elapsed since the events giving rise to the claim . . . .”176
This six month period is presumably designed to allow the claimant and the government
an opportunity for settlement negotiations. If the claimant meets the six months
requirement, and 90 days has elapsed since the communication of the notice of intent, as
noted above, she may submit her claim, designating one of the three rule/forum options
provided under the Agreement, the ICSID Convention and the ICSID Arbitration Rules,
the ICSID Additional Facility Rules,177 or the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules.178
(UNCITRAL, unlike ICSID, provides no secretariat, so parties seeking arbitration under
the UNCITRAL Rules must arrange for secretariat services either at ICSID, another
existing arbitration secretariat, or make ad hoc arrangements.)
For most disputes under CAFTA-DR, there will not really be three alternatives,
but only two, the ICSID Arbitration Rules and the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules.179 The
ICSID Secretariat is authorized to administer conciliation and arbitration proceedings
under the ICSID Additional Facility rules “for the settlement of legal disputes arising
directly out of an investment which are not within the jurisdiction of the Centre because
either the State party to the dispute or the State whose national is a party to the dispute is
not a Contracting State” or proceedings “which are not within the jurisdiction of the
Centre because they do not arise directly out of an investment, provided that either the
State party to the dispute or the State whose national is a party to the dispute is a
Contracting State . . . .”180 Since all seven CAFTA-DR parties are also parties to the
ICSID Convention,181 the ICSID Secretary General would not be authorized to administer
a dispute involving a CAFTA-DR investor and a state under the Additional Facility,
172

See, e.g., Kenex Ltd. v. United States, Notice of Intent to Submit a Claim to Arbitration (12 pages);
Glamis Gold, Ltd. v. United States, Notice of Intent to Submit a Claim to Arbitration (14 pages); but see
Methanex v. United State, Notice of Intent to Submit a Claim to Arbitration (4 pages), all available at
http://www.naftaclaims.com (visited Aug. 2, 2006). In a number of cases, the notice of intent is not
publicly available.
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Cabinet level representatives of the Parties, as established under art. 19.1.
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Statement of the Free Trade Commission on notices of intent to submit a claim to arbitration, Oct. 7,
2004, available at http://www.naftaclaims.com/Papers/NoticeIntent-en.pdf (visited Aug. 2, 2006).
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Id., at 1.
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CAFTA-DR, art. 10.16.3.
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For arbitration under ICSID, the arbitration is governed by relevant provisions of both the ICSID
Convention and the ICSID Arbitration Rules. Where the ICSID Additional Facility Rules are used, as
either the host state or the investor’s home state is not a party to ICSID, only the Additional Facility Rules
themselves govern the arbitration.
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CAFTA-DR, art. 10.16.3.
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ICSID Additional Facility Rules, Art. 2, available at http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/facility/partAarticle.htm (visited Aug. 2, 2006).
181
See ICSID Convention, supra note 78.
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unless the Secretary General were to determine that it did not arise directly out of an
investment. The “Investment” requirement is embodied in the ICSID Convention itself,
but is not defined there.182 It is in theory conceivable—although very unlikely-- that a
claim based on provisions of an investment authorization or investment agreement under
CAFTA-DR, or a claim considered an investment under NAFTA, might not be
considered a dispute arising “directly out of an investment” and thus shifted from the
ICSID Arbitration Rules to the ICSID Additional Facility Rules.
Notice is considered delivered when received by the ICSID Secretary General (for
arbitrations under either of the ICSID rules) or by the respondent (for arbitration under
UNCITRAL). Under the ICSID Convention, the Secretary General acts as registrar, and
at least in theory may refuse to register a claim if, for example, in his view it does not
“arise directly out of an investment” or does not otherwise meet the rules of the
Convention.183 In contrast, if a claim is filed under the UNCITRAL Rules with the
respondent, any jurisdictional issues will presumably be decided by the arbitral tribunal,
although there is of course a risk that the respondent state will refuse to cooperate. At the
time the notice is submitted, the claimant is to provide the name or the arbitrator she
wishes to appoint or consent in writing to appointment by the ICSID Secretary General184
as appointing authority.
To avoid confusion, particularly when the notices are to be filed under
UNCITRAL with the respondent state rather than the ICSID Secretary General, CAFTADR provides specific addresses for claimant delivery of notices and other documents.185
This should make it more difficult for respondents to argue that they have not received
timely notices and other served documents.
CAFTA-DR,186 like virtually all U.S. FTA investment chapters and BITs,
constitutes the necessary written consent by the governments to the jurisdiction of ICSID,
“an agreement in writing” under the New York Convention”187 and an “agreement” the
Inter-American Convention.188 Thus, a CAFTA-DR Party cannot refuse to arbitrate on
the grounds that it did not consent to the arbitration.
182

Id., Article 25, provides in pertinent part that “The jurisdiction of the Centre shall extend to any legal
dispute arising directly out of an investment, between a Contracting State (or any constituent subdivision or
agency of a Contracting State designated to the Centre by that State) and a national of another Contracting
State. . . .”
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Id., arts. 11, 25. According to one authority (Todd Weiler), the ICSID Secretariat refused to register
the “Baha Beach” claim against Mexico because the investors could not provide proof of authorization by
each named claimant to proceed. See Notice of Intent to Supply a Claim, Billy Joe Adams et al., Nov. 10,
2000, available at http://naftaclaims.com/Disputes/Mexico/Adams/AdamsNoticeOfIntent.pdf (visited Nov.
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Id., art. 10.27, annex 10-G.
186
Id., art. 10.17.
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the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, Jun.
10, 1958, available at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/NY-conv/XXII_1_e.pdf
(visited Dec. 15, 2006).
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http://www.sice.oas.org/dispute/comarb/iacac/iacac2e.asp (visited Dec. 15, 2006).

34

Draft: Jan. 6, 2007
Not to be cited or quoted without author’s permission
For the claimant, of course, there has been no prior consent to arbitration (unless
it was contained in an investment agreement), and in CAFTA-DR, as in NAFTA, a
prospective claimant must meet a number of procedural requirements in order for
arbitration under Chapter 10 to proceed. First, there is a statute of limitations: “No claim
may be submitted to arbitration under this Section of more than three years have elapsed
from the date on which the claimant first acquired, or should have first acquired,
knowledge of the breach alleged” and that either the claimant or enterprise “has incurred
loss or damage.”189 For a case that is based on an ongoing series of actions or measures
that allegedly conflict with state obligations under Section A, this may mean that any
recovery will be limited to damages for no more than the most recent three years after the
claim is filed (unless of course the claimant only recently discovered a course of action
by the government that was ongoing for many years). This three year window for
seeking arbitration may be significantly narrowed if the claimant, once becoming aware
of the potential breach, fails to pursue any advisable consultations on negotiations, and
submission of the notice of intent, promptly.190
Secondly, the claimant must formally consent to the arbitration.191 Third,
CAFTA-DR contains what amounts to a “no u-turn” provision for investors of most
Parties but a “fork in the road” provision for U.S. investors in the other Parties.192 The
claimant or enterprise is required, as a condition of arbitration, to waive the right to
initiate or continue administrative tribunal or court proceedings under the law of any
party (presumably local law in virtually all cases), except for interim injunctive relief not
seeking monetary damages.193 (For U.S. investors, once an action challenging a Party
action as a violation of Section A is lodged in a local court or tribunal, arbitration under
Section B is precluded.194) Provisions of this type are related to the fact that under
CAFTA-DR, as with most such investment protection agreements, the traditional
customary requirement that a claimant exhaust local and administrative remedies before
bringing an international claim195 does not exist.196 Similar language is found in
NAFTA.197
189

CAFTA-DR, art. 10.18.1.
In Feldman, supra note 103, the claimant had alleged a continuing course of conduct going back not
only more than three years, but for several years before NAFTA entered into force, and had not filed his
NAFTA claim at the earliest possible. Under these circumstances, although a majority of the tribunal
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42 I.L.M. at 634-35.
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jurisdiction.
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Under NAFTA jurisprudence, Loewen, supra note 75, if the claimant is effectively challenging the
validity of a national court decision the bar is higher; she must essentially demonstrate a denial of justice
under international law, not simply that the result might otherwise have been a denial of fair and equitable
treatment under art. 1105. See also Robert Azinian, Kenneth Davitian & Ellen Baca. v. United Mexican
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The CAFTA-DR provisions do not on their face appear to require at the outset a
choice between international arbitration or local court action. Rather once arbitration is
initiated, the local option is no longer available, so that existing actions must be
terminated and new ones cannot be initiated.198 However, this choice may be more
apparent than real for U.S. investors, as an annex essentially provides that when the
claimant is a U.S. investor against one of the Central American Parties or the Dominican
Republic the election is definitive: should a breach of Section A be lodged first in a local
court or administrative tribunal, “the investor may not thereafter submit the claim to
arbitration under Section B.”199 (The investor may protect herself if in the local court
action she alleges only violations of local law.)
The rule for challenges based on investment authorizations or investment
agreements (rather than Section A) even more explicitly requires a choice that once made
is irrevocable. If a potential CAFTA-DR Chapter 10 claimant “has previously submitted
the same alleged breach to an administrative tribunal or court of the respondent, or to any
other binding dispute settlement procedure, for adjudication or resolution” the claimant is
barred from the Chapter 10 remedy.200 Whether tribunals will actually refuse to hear
such claims remains to be seen. Jurisprudence under various BITs suggests that claims
may be allowed to proceed if there is no identity of parties and issues, or if the local
claim was premised on local law alone, with the international claim being premised on
international law as reflected in the BIT or FTA investment provisions201 (or, by analogy,
on the Section A language of CAFTA-DR).
B.

The Arbitral Process

Under CAFA-DR, as under NAFTA and most other such investment agreements,
there are normally three arbitrators, two appointed by the parties and the third appointed
by agreement of the parties. If the parties do not agree within 75 days after submission of
the claim—a frequent occurrence—the third arbitrator is appointed by the ICSID
Secretary General (even if the arbitration is taking place under the UNCITRAL rules).202
The respondent state is deemed to have agreed (with prejudice to objection on grounds
other than nationality), and the claimant must agree in writing, to appointment of the

States, Case no. ARB(AF)/97/2 (Nov. 1, 1999), 39 I.L.M. 537, 555 (2000) [hereinafter Azinian]; Mondev,
supra note 117, 42 I.L.M. at 109-110.
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CAFTA-DR, art. 18.2(b).
199
CAFTA-DR, Annex 10-E.
200
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See Ronald S. Lauder and The Czech Republic (Final Award) (Sep. 3, 2001), available at
http://www.investmentclaims.com/decisions/Lauder-Czech-FinalAward-3Sept2001.pdf (visited Aug. 27,
2006) (lack of identity of parties and issues); OEPC v. Ecuador, Case no. 3467, Jul. 1, 2004, available at
http://www.investmentclaims.com/decisions/Occidental-Ecuador-FinalAward-1Jul2004.pdf (visited Aug.
27, 2006) (different legal questions addressed before the tribunal compared to those raised in national
courts).
202
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three arbitrators, for purposes of the ICSID Convention and the ISCID Additional
Facility rules.203
In general, the conduct of the arbitration is consistent with the rules applicable
under the relevant arbitral rules and NAFTA, with one significant exception. As is usual,
the tribunal determines the “place” of arbitration after consultation with the parties.204
(This is important, because in the case of ICSID Additional Facility or UNCITRAL
arbitration, it determines what national courts would have any jurisdiction over any
challenges to the award. For ICSID arbitrations, the only challenge is in theory to an
ICSID Annulment Committee,205 but when a judgment is entered in a national court some
additional challenges may nevertheless be possible.) “Interim measures of protection”
may be ordered by the tribunal, essentially to preserve the status quo pending
adjudication of the claim.206 Respondents are also barred from asserting as a defense that
all or part of a claim is covered by insurance,207 presumably in order to protect the
interests of the Overseas Private Investment Corporation, or any similar agency that
issues political risk and other forms of insurance in any of the CAFTA-DR countries.208
However, there are some innovations. As in NAFTA, a “non-disputing Party”
may present its views either orally or in writing to the tribunal “regarding the
interpretation of this Agreement.”209 This has happened occasionally in NAFTA210, and
may be more frequent in CAFTA-DR, because in each dispute there are likely to be six
rather than only two non-disputing Parties (which include the investor’s government).
Most significantly, and unlike NAFTA, CAFTA-DR states:
Without prejudice to a tribunal’s authority to address other objections as a
preliminary question, a tribunal shall address and decide as a preliminary
question any objection by the respondent that, as a matter of law, a claim
submitted is not a claim for which an award in favor of the claimant may
be made under Article 10.26 [awards] . . . .211
When a jurisdictional objection is submitted by the respondent state in accordance
with the requirements of this section (within 45 days after the constitution of the
tribunal), the tribunal “shall decide on an expedited basis,” suspending proceedings on
203
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the merits, and “issue a decision or award on the objection(s) within 150 days” subject to
extension under certain circumstances.212 Costs and attorneys’ fees may be awarded in
such proceedings in circumstances in which the claim or the respondent’s objection is
considered “frivolous,” and by implication in others as well.213 This provision is
presumably designed to discourage “frivolous” actions by private claimants, and to assure
(or at least to strongly encourage) tribunals to decide what are effectively motions to
dismiss or motions for summary judgment in U.S. parlance as preliminary matters, rather
than to combine them with decisions on the merits. Separately, a tribunal under CAFTADR is explicitly authorized to “award costs and attorney’s fees in accordance with this
Section and the applicable arbitration rules.”214 Recent NAFTA tribunals have not been
reluctant to award costs and attorneys’ fees largely or entirely to the prevailing party
when the tribunal felt it was appropriate215, and the inclusion of the “frivolous” language
may encourage CAFTA-DR tribunals to do the same.
This language likely results from U.S. frustration with several NAFTA Chapter
11 proceedings in which dismissal on jurisdictional grounds required several years of
proceedings216, or was combined with a decision on the merits.217 While the problem if
any seems mostly a question of tribunals finding it difficult to decide jurisdictional issues
promptly, rather than refusing to sever jurisdictional issues from the merits, there will
likely be times when the two are sufficiently entwined as to make it impractical to
consider them separately. This is probably most likely to occur, where, for example,
evidence to be developed in the course of the proceeding will be relevant to jurisdictional
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questions as well as substantive ones. In any event, CAFTA-DR claimants are on notice
to be prepared for jurisdictional objections at the outset.
Several other provisions relating to the conduct of the arbitration are worth
noting. As in NAFTA,218 a CAFTA-DR tribunal may, at the request of a disputing party
or, in the absence of their objection, on its own initiative, appoint “one or more experts to
report to it in writing on any factual issue concerning environmental, health, safety or
other scientific matters raised by a disputing party . . . .”219 This is without prejudice to
the possibility of appointing other kinds of experts if permitted by the applicable
arbitration rules220 (which normally is not the case without the permission of the parties).
Given that the arbitrators are in most cases likely to be experts in investment law, the
possible need for bringing in expertise in these other areas is obvious.
There is also provision for consolidating two or more claims that have “a question
of law or fact in common and arise out of the same events or circumstances,” at the
request of a disputing party and with the agreement of the disputing party, subject to
certain procedural requirements concerning the request and the appointment of arbitrators
in consolidated cases.221 Consolidation has been accepted only once to date under
NAFTA, at the initiative of the respondent United States, with regard to three claims
alleging violations of Section A arising out of the antidumping and countervailing duty
orders imposed by United States authorities on softwood lumber imports from Canada.222
C.

Transparency

An area addressed for NAFTA only after the fact, but directly in the text with
CAFTA-DR, is a provision which requires transparency of the proceedings. All of the
major documents (notice of intent, notice of arbitration, pleadings, memorials and briefs,
submissions relating to protected information, minutes or transcripts of the hearings,
orders, awards and decisions) must be made public “promptly.”223 Hearings are to be
open to the public.224 In all instances there is an exception for protected information and
procedures for protecting such information against unauthorized disclosure,225 with the
further exception to the exception that a respondent may nevertheless disclose otherwise
protected information when required by law.226 CAFTA-DR also authorizes the tribunal
to “accept and consider amicus curiae submissions from a person or entity that is not a
disputing party.”227
218
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This explicit language reflects concerns raised by NGOs and some U.S.
government officials regarding the lack of transparency and of NGO access to the
NAFTA Chapter 11 process, which is thought by some to have contributed to skepticism
of the process within the United States. For example, under the ICSID Additional Facility
Rules, a popular mechanism under Chapter 11, the process was not transparent, as neither
the written nor the oral proceedings were open to the public. 228 However, the degree of
transparency of the process was increased significantly beginning in July 2001, when the
governments stated that “nothing in NAFTA imposes a general duty of confidentiality”
and agreed that they would “make available to the public in a timely manner all
documents submitted to, or issued by, Chapter 11 tribunals” subject to certain exceptions
for confidential or privileged information.229 In October 2003, Canada and the United
States, but not Mexico, issued statements indicating that they would consent - and request
disputing investors and tribunals to consent - to holding hearings that are open to the
public, subject to measures to protect confidential business information.230 At the same
time, a statement was issued setting forth procedures for non-disputing party (amicus
curiae) participation in Chapter 11 proceedings.231 The language in these NAFTA
Commission statements was the model for the CAFTA-DR provisions on transparency.
D.

Applicable Law

As noted in the discussions of Section A, the scope of “international law” and
“customary international law” have been an issue under the NAFTA case law, NAFTA
Commission interpretations and, ultimately, in the drafting of CAFTA-DR. As in
NAFTA, in CAFTA-DR tribunals are directed to decide cases under Section A “in
accordance with this Agreement and applicable rules of international law.”232 In a
number of NAFTA cases, among others, the references to “international law” relate not
only to substantive international law provisions on investment, when not specified in
NAFTA, but also to procedural law, particularly to the rules of interpretation set out in
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.233
228

See ICSID Arbitration (Additional Facility) Rules, supra note 180, Art. 39 (giving the tribunal
authority to decide, with the Parties’ consent, what persons may be admitted to the hearing; publication of
the minutes of the hearing requires the Parties’ consent under Art. 44).
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NAFTA Free Trade Commission, Notes of Interpretation, parts A(1), A(2) (Jul. 30, 2001), available at
http://www.ustr.gov (visited Aug. 3, 2006).
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Statement on Open Hearings in NAFTA Chapter Eleven Arbitrations, Oct. 7, 2003, available at
<http://www.ustr.gov; Statement of Canada on Open Hearings in NAFTA Chapter Eleven Arbitrations
(Oct. 2003), available at http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca (visited Aug. 3, 2006).
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See Statement of the Free Trade Commission on non-disputing party participation (Oct. 2003),
available at <http://www.ustr.gov>; NAFTA Commission Meet, Announces New Transparency Measures,
USTR Press Release, Oct. 7, 2003, at 1. The United States is not a party to the Vienna Convention, but
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The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 39/27, available
at http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/1_1_1969.pdf (visited Dec. 15, 2006),
particularly arts. 31-32, have been cited by many NAFTA and other tribunals as the basis for interpreting
“the Agreement and applicable rules of international law. See, e.g., the first NAFTA decision on the
merits, Metalclad, supra note 124, 40 I.L.M. 36, 46.
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With regard to cases arising under investment authorizations or investment
agreements, the tribunal is to apply the rules of law specified in the relevant agreements
or agreed upon by the parties or, in the event of no such specification or agreement, the
law of the respondent state (including its conflicts of laws rules) and “such rules of
international law as may be applicable.”234
As in NAFTA, the Commission235 has the power to issue an interpretation of the
provisions of the investment chapter, which “shall be binding on the tribunal . . . .”236
However, unlike NAFTA, CAFTA-DR adds “and any decision or award issued by the
tribunal must be consistent with that decision.”237 This addition is presumably designed
to deal with tribunals such as the one in Pope & Talbot, which having received a
Commission Interpretation, nevertheless considered carefully whether it would follow the
Interpretation or ignore it, ultimately rather huffily agreeing that it was binding.238
CAFTA-DR (like NAFTA) provides a mechanism whereby a respondent state, when
arguing that an alleged breach is within one of the exceptions in Annexes I or II, may
request the Commission to interpret the annex at issue. The Commission is to issue a
decision on the request within 60 days of the request. If it fails to issue the decision
within that period, the tribunal may proceed to decide the issue without the Commission’s
input.239
Whether the issuance of formal Commission “interpretations” (or decisions under
Annexes I or II) will turn out to be more common under CAFTA-DR than the issuance of
interpretations under NAFTA—once in thirteen years—remains to be seen. One might
speculate that the difficulties of getting three sovereign governments to agree a) that the
issuance of an interpretation was warranted; and b) how that interpretation should be
worded, would be even more complicated under an agreement with seven members of the
Free Trade Commission. Annex I and II decisions, at least, are subject to a specific
deadline, although it is problematic whether agreement can be reached when dealing with
complex and controversial issues.240 (Needless to say, Commission interpretations will
be easier to bring about that any formal amending of the Agreement.)
E.

Awards and Challenges

The basic awards language in CAFTA-DR is little changed from NAFTA,241
except that in the former awards, finality and enforcement are addressed in a single
234
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article instead of several. Awards are limited to monetary damages, or to giving the
respondent state the option of providing restitution of property or monetary damages plus
interest.242 If the claim has been brought by an enterprise, the award of monetary
damages and interest or restitution shall be provided to the enterprise. Issues regarding
who may have a right to right to the “relief” are decided under domestic law.243 No
punitive damages may be awarded.244
However, there is one major innovation, an interim review procedure:
In any arbitration conducted under this Section, at the request of a
disputing party, a tribunal shall, before issuing a decision or award on
liability, transmit its proposed decision or award to the disputing parties
and to the non-disputing Parties. Within 60 days after the tribunal
transmits its proposed decision or award, the disputing parties may submit
written comments to the tribunal concerning any aspect of its proposed
decision or award. The tribunal shall consider any such comments and
issue its decision or award not later than 45 days after the expiration of the
60-day comment period.245
This procedure is apparently designed to permit the parties (most likely the respondent
state) to comment on the award before it becomes final, in a manner similar to the review
process afforded WTO Members involved in panel proceedings before the Dispute
Settlement Body of the World Trade Organization.246
The awards language and other provisions of CAFTA-DR Chapter 10, as in
NAFTA, provide little useful guidance to tribunals in determining the amount of the
award, or the rate and period of interest, except when an expropriation is found. There,
under Article 10.7, there are detailed guidelines for determining the amount of
compensation and the calculation of interest for takings coming within the scope of
Article 10.7.247 For other violations of Section A, or for violations of investment
242
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Id., art. 10.20.6.
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See DSU, supra note 44, art. 15 (applicable only to panel decisions, not to decisions of the WTO
Appellate Body; Menaker, supra note 77, at 128 (noting the similarity of this investment decision review
procedure to that used in the WTO).
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CAFTA-DR, art. 10.7.2-4. Arguably, a tribunal that found a taking that failed to comport with the
expropriation requirements of Article 10.7 might take the position that the measure of compensation
specified in that provision was in applicable. See ADC Affiliate Ltd. et al. v. Republic of Hungary, Oct. 2,
2006, ICSID Case no. ARB/03/16, paras. 480-482, available at
http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/ADCvHungaryAward.pdf (visited Nov. 27, 2006) (holding that where
there had been an unlawful expropriation under a bilateral investment treaty specifying only “just
compensation,” it was appropriate for the tribunal to use a higher, customary international law standard of
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under CAFTA-DR, a very explicit compensation standard is provided in Article 10, specifying fair market
value at the time of the taking. Art. 10.7.2(b), and it seems unlikely that a tribunal would apply a different
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authorizations or investment agreements (unless the latter specify calculation of
damages), having found “that the claimant has incurred loss or damage by reason of, or
arising out of, that breach,”248 the tribunals are left to their own to develop a proper
measure of damages. Nevertheless, in the four cases under NAFTA in which damages
have been awarded, calculation of the amounts did not prove a major problem for the
tribunal. As the arbitrators deemed appropriate, they used adjusted book value,249 the
amount of the uncontested losses sustained by the claimant,250 a type of going concern
value,251 and the approximate costs of the claimant as a result of the respondent’s denial
of fair and equitable treatment.252
Enforcement of an award is deferred for 120 days in the case of an ICSID
Convention arbitration, and 90 days in the event the arbitration was conducted under the
ICSID Additional Facility or UNCITRAL Rules; then it may be enforced if no party has
requested annulment under ICSID or revision under the other two mechanisms.253 An
award by a tribunal operating under the ICSID Convention Arbitration Rules is subject to
limited review, to annulment Aon one or more of the following grounds@:
(a) that the Tribunal was not properly constituted;
(b) that the Tribunal has manifestly exceeded its powers;
(c) that there was corruption on the part of a member of the
Tribunal;
(d) that there has been a serious departure from a fundamental
rule of procedure; or
(e) that the award has failed to state the reasons on which it is
based.254
An ad hoc committee of three is appointed from a panel of arbitrators, with the
authority to annul the award or any part of it; if the award is annulled either party to
the arbitration may request that the dispute be submitted to a new tribunal.
The ICSID Annulment Committee procedures are not available for arbitral awards
under either the UNCITRAL Rules or the ICSID Additional Facility Rules. In either
248
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instance, a court proceeding may be brought to set aside or annul the award, in the state
that has been designated as the situs (place) of the arbitration.255 This has occurred
several times in the NAFTA context, all by Canadian federal or provincial courts.256 The
criteria for review by the ICSID annulment committee are also relatively narrow: the
tribunal was not properly constituted; the tribunal “manifestly exceeded its powers”;
there was corruption on the part of a member of the tribunal; there was a “serious
departure from a fundamental rule of procedure; or the award failed to state the reasons
upon which it was based.257
Neither ICSID Annulment Committee nor national court review have been
considered a fully satisfactory means of dealing with arbitral awards. Under such
circumstances, the idea of a single appellate mechanism,258 perhaps modeled after the
WTO’s Appellate Body, has received support from diverse sources. NGOs and some
government agencies have been concerned about the lack of appeals, a situation that
means ad hoc arbitrators cannot be controlled and any legal errors that are made cannot
be effectively corrected for the current or for future cases. The use of the NAFTA
Commission’s power to issue binding Interpretations (noted above), suffers from the
uncertainties noted earlier which may carry over to the CAFTA-DR Commission. Also,
arbitral decisions, even though not serving as precedent, are likely to be considered by
subsequent tribunals. As a result, the President’s Trade Promotion Authority states :
“[T]he principal negotiating objectives of the United States regarding foreign investment
are . . . to secure for investors important rights comparable to those that would be
available under United States legal principles and practice, by . . . providing for an
appellate body or similar mechanism to provide coherence to the interpretations of trade
agreements . . . .”259 (U.S. concerns are not shared by ICSID. In 2004, the secretariat
proposed the creation of an appellate mechanism, but the proposal was later
withdrawn.260)
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See NAFTA, art. 1136:3.
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Relatively weak language in the Singapore and Chile FTAs, and in later FTAs
with Peru and Colombia261 on this subject was replaced in CAFTA-DR alone with a
much more explicit (and likely less realistic) directive, requiring the Parties within three
months of the entry into force of CAFTA-DR to set up a negotiating group “to develop an
appellate body or similar mechanism to review awards rendered by tribunals under this
Chapter.”262 The negotiating group is to provide the Commission with a draft within one
year of its establishment.263 The issues to be considered are enumerated, and include its
composition; scope and standard of review; transparency; effect of decisions; relationship
to applicable arbitral rules; and relationship to existing domestic and international laws
on enforcement of arbitral awards.264
Whether the negotiating group once appointed will be able to agree upon a
proposal is at this writing an open question, as the legal and procedural challenges to
creating a satisfactory appellate mechanism are not to be dismissed lightly.265 However,
if successful, and if the mechanism is approved by the CAFTA-DR Parties, it might
provide a greater level of certainty and predictability to arbitral awards under Chapter 10.
V.

Government to Government Disputes Under Chapter 20
A.

NAFTA Antecedents of CAFTA-DR Dispute Settlement

The CAFTA-DR dispute settlement mechanism follows NAFTA Chapter 20 with
some modifications; NAFTA in turn closely follows Chapter 18 of the U.S. – Canada
Free Trade Agreement (“CFTA”). Given the inclusion of a provision in the 1947 GATT
recognizing the need for a means to resolve disputes over the interpretation and
application of trade agreements,266 and nearly forty years of third party dispute resolution
under the GATT and the WTO at the time of the CFTA negotiations, the issue in the
NAFTA negotiations, and in later FTAs, was less whether there should be such a
mechanism as to how it should be structured.
In most such situations, panels of trade experts appointed on an ad hoc basis
opine on the legal aspects of disputes between member governments, based on the “law”
of the relevant international agreements (NAFTA or the GATT and other WTO
agreements), in a typical international arbitral procedure consisting of consultations,
briefings, a hearing, and the issuance of an opinion or report. A draft of what is now the
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whether to establish a bilateral appellate body or similar mechanism to review awards rendered under
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WTO’s Dispute Settlement Understanding267 existed at the time of the NAFTA
negotiations.268 While the NAFTA negotiators were aware of the DSU draft, there
appears to have been relatively little “borrowing” from the DSU in NAFTA, Chapter 20,
perhaps in part because of the desire of both Canada and the United States to avoid
wholesale renegotiation of CFTA, Chapter 18.269 CAFTA-DR, in contrast, appears to
reflect somewhat more significantly some of the provisions and practices under the
WTO’s Dispute Settlement Understanding (as well as under NAFTA), since at the time
of the CAFTA-DR negotiations the governments had eight years of experience under the
DSU.
The CFTA general dispute settlement system was considered to offer “a
significant improvement to the traditional, pre-WTO GATT proceedings” by making the
formation of a panel mandatory on the request of either Party and for providing deadlines
for each stage of the process, but the rulings there, as in GATT, were only
recommendations, while leaving the prevailing Party the option of retaliation.270 The
scope of Chapter 20 is broader that CFTA largely because NAFTA is broader than the
CFTA, covering, inter alia, such areas as intellectual property, standards, sanitary and
phytosanitary measures and to a limited degree, the environment.271 CAFTA-DR
jurisdiction is broader still, because disputes over compliance with labor and
environmental obligations are subject to Chapter 20, rather than to dispute resolution in
separate “side” agreements.
The most recent NAFTA Chapter 20 panel decision was rendered in February
2001 , six years ago and several years before the CAFTA-DR negotiations. There have
been only three regular Chapter 20 panel decisions and one non-NAFTA proceeding
using Chapter 20 rules.273 The jurisprudence is thus quite limited compared to the wealth
272
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271
See, e.g., NAFTA, supra note 30, Art.104 (environmental agreements), Chapter 7B (sanitary and
phytosanitary measures), Chapter 9 (standards), Chapter 14 (financial services), Chapter 17 (intellectual
property).
272
In the Matter of Cross-Border Trucking Services and Investment, Case no. USA-MEX-98-2008-01
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of NAFTA investment dispute tribunal decisions274, but is worth mentioning to provide a
flavor of the types of disputes for which the mechanism has been utilized.275
In the first, the United States charged that NAFTA required Canada to eliminate
duties on certain dairy products (Dairy Products). Under the WTO Agreement on
Agriculture, Canada had agreed to “tarification” of dairy products (conversion of
quantitative restraints to tariffs), but there is no obligation under the WTO to eliminate
tariffs. Under NAFTA, in contrast, all tariffs must be eliminated within no more than 15
years. Canada took the position that these items are exempt from the NAFTA tariff
reductions; the United States disagreed. Although NAFTA does not specify the use of a
neutral country fifth arbitrator, a panel consisting of two Canadian and two U.S. law
professors was chosen, with a British law professor as chairperson. The panel ultimately
determined unanimously that Canada’s actions were consistent with NAFTA.276
In another action, Mexico challenged the United States’ application of safeguards
to corn brooms from Mexico (Brooms). Mexico argued that the application of the
safeguards was inconsistent with NAFTA, Chapter 8 and with the WTO Agreement on
Safeguards. The panel, chaired by an Australian government official, found unanimously
in favor of Mexico, holding that the U.S. International Trade Commission had failed to
explain adequately its “domestic industry” determination in violation of NAFTA.277
Cross Border Trucking Services involved the refusal of the United States to
implement a NAFTA provision requiring the United States and Mexico, as of December
1995, to permit each other’s trucking firms to carry international cargoes between the ten
Mexican and four U.S. border states. Investment by Mexican firms in U.S. trucking
companies had also been blocked. Mexico had charged that the United States had
violated the national treatment and most-favored nation treatment provisions of Chapter
violation of the agreement. as a result of British Columbia’s reduction of certain charges for harvesting
timber from government-owned lands, “In the Matter of British Columbia’s June 1, 1998 Stumpage
Reduction.” The panel, operating generally under the NAFTA Chapter 20 Rules of Procedure, reviewed
briefs submitted by the Parties, held a hearing and drafted a decision, but the case was settled by the Parties
one day before the decision was due. See Exchange of Diplomatic Notes dated Aug. 26, 1999 (on file with
author).
274
Also, there have been more than 100 actions filed under the procedures set out in NAFTA, Chapter 19
(not replicated in CAFTA-DR or any subsequent United States, Mexican or Canadian FTA); see NAFTA
Secretariat, Status Report: NAFTA & FTA Dispute Settlement Proceedings, available at http://www.naftasec-alena.org/DefaultSite/index_e.aspx?DetailID=9 (visited Dec. 13, 2006).
275
More detailed discussions of the Chapter 20 process from the point of view of a panelist are available
in Sidney J. Picker, NAFTA Chapter 20 – Reflections on Party-to-Party Dispute Resolution, 14 Ariz. J. Int’l
& Comp. L. 465 (1997) and David A. Gantz, Government-to-Government Dispute Resolution Under
NAFTA’s Chapter 20: A Commentary on the Process, 11 AM. REV. INT’L ARB 481 (2000).
276
Tariffs Applied by Canada to Certain U.S.-Origin Agricultural Products, Case no. CDA-95-2008-01
(Dec. 2, 1996), available at http://www.nafta-secalena.org/app/DocRepository/1/Dispute/english/NAFTA_Chapter_20/Canada/cb95010e.pdf (visited Aug.
16, 2006) [hereinafter “Dairy”]
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U.S. Safeguard Action Taken on Broomcorn Brooms from Mexico, Case no. USA-97-2008-01 (Jan.
30, 1998), citing NAFTA Annex 803.3(12), available at http://www.nafta-secalena.org/app/DocRepository/1/Dispute/english/NAFTA_Chapter_20/USA/ub97010e.pdf (visited Aug. 16,
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11 (investment) and Chapter 12 (cross-border services), as well as the specific provisions
of Annex I imposing such obligations. The Panel ultimately agreed unanimously with
Mexico, although in recognition of legitimate safety concerns in the United States, it held
that “to the extent that the inspection and licensing requirements for Mexican truckers
and drivers wishing to operate in the United States may not be ‘like’ those in place in the
United States, different methods of ensuring compliance with the U.S. regulatory regime
may be justifiable.”278
Insofar as the author has been able to determine,279 at least ten other matters have
reached at least the consultation stage under Chapter 20.280 Some of these were resolved
through consultations, although most of the details are unknown, suggesting that with
NAFTA, Chapter 20, as with most formal dispute settlement mechanisms, success cannot
be measured solely by the number of cases that went to term.
The NAFTA impact on CAFTA-DR Chapter 20 necessarily reflects some
apparent unhappiness on the part of the United States with NAFTA’s Chapter 20.281 The
United States government had not been fully satisfied with the results under CFTA,
Chapter 18; several of the five cases decided under those proceedings were thought to be
poorly reasoned decisions, and there was no reason to believe that Chapter 20 would
work better. Thus, even from the outset, there was healthy skepticism of the process on
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Cross Border Trucking Services, supra 103, para. 301; see also paras. 295-300, 302.
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U.S., 1995); c) Restrictions on Small Package Delivery (U.S. v. Mexico, 1995); d) Restrictions on Tomato
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sold in Mexico. The Chapter 20 case technically remains pending, but the U.S. authorities have refused for
more than four years to appoint panelists, a refusal that was effectively supported by a WTO panel. In
Mexico - Tax Measures on Soft Drinks and Other Beverages, Appellate Body Report, WT/DS308/AB/R,
adopted Mar. 24, 2006, available at http://www.wto.org , the Appellate Body upheld a panel decision
rejecting Mexico’s request that the panel and appellate body decline to exercise WTO jurisdiction because
the matter was “inextricably linked to a broader dispute” which only a NAFTA [Chapter 20] panel could
properly decide. The Appellate Body concluded that once it was established that a WTO panel had
jurisdiction, it could not refuse to exercise it. See paras. 10, 40, 57. That case has apparently been resolved
by the United States and Mexico, but not through the Chapter 20 mechanisms. See Daniel Pruzin, U.S.,
Mexico Reach Agreement on WTO Soft Drink Dispute Compliance Deadline, 23 INT’L TRADE REP. (BNA)
1069 (Jul. 13, 2006) (discussing a settlement in which Mexico will implement a WTO decision holding that
an excise tax on corn syrup violates WTO rules); USTR Announces Sugar Quota Allocations; Producers
Cite ‘Disorder’ in Import Increase, 23 INT’L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1191 (Aug. 10, 2006) (indicating that
Mexico’s sugar quotas for 2006 and 2007 have been increased).
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the part of U.S. officials.282 Perhaps more significantly, some issues, such as those
involving dumping and illegal subsidies, effectively require resolution by the WTO’s
Dispute Settlement Body because they are excluded from NAFTA jurisdiction,283 or
because the NAFTA Parties preferred to take their frequent disputes over “unfair” trade
actions to Geneva. Those who expect adjudicatory systems to follow set time limits and
strict procedural rules are likely to find the NAFTA Chapter 20 system wanting, in part
because of the inherent difficulty in forming panels where there is no independent
secretariat—in either NAFTA or CAFTA-DR—to assure that deadlines are met.284
Presumably, there is hope on the part of the U.S. negotiators that adaptation of some of
the WTO’s post-decision procedures, discussed below, will improve the operation of the
CAFTA-DR mechanism compared to that of NAFTA.
The CAFTA-DR mechanism thus begins its existence under something of a cloud
reflecting U.S. dissatisfaction with the operation of NAFTA, Chapter 20. Nevertheless, it
can be hoped that all of the CAFTA-DR governments realize that such a mechanism in
CAFTA-DR is necessary, even if they don’t necessarily have full confidence in its
viability.
B.

The Chapter 20 Mechanism
1.

Functions of the Free Trade Commission

Although it has no practical significance, structurally, the content of NAFTA
Chapter 20 is divided between CAFTA-DR Chapters 19 and 20, as the Free Trade
Commission is treated in a separate chapter in CAFTA-DR. As in NAFTA, the Free
Trade Commission is comprised of cabinet level representatives or their delegates, but
unlike NAFTA, CAFTA-DR specifies the officials for each country, in all cases other
than the United States, the ministries of economy (El Salvador, Guatemala), industry and
commerce (Dominican Republic, Honduras), development, industry and commerce
(Nicaragua) and foreign commerce (Costa Rica).285 For the United States the
commissioner is the U.S. Trade Representative.286 The same agencies, but at the director
general (or Assistant USTR) level, are also designated the “free trade coordinators.”287
The Commission’s responsibilities go well beyond dispute settlement, including as well
supervision of implementation of the Agreement; overseeing the “further elaboration” of
the Agreement (e.g., establishing a negotiating group under Annex 10-F to consider a
mechanism for review of arbitral decisions in investor-state disputes); resolution of
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Discussion with a former U.S. government official involved in both CAFTA Chapter 18 and NAFTA
Chapter 20 negotiations. (Memorandum of Conversation, May 31, 2005 on file with author.)
283
NAFTA, art. 1901(3) provides that, “...[N]o provision of any other Chapter of this Agreement shall be
construed as imposing obligations on a Party with respect to the Party’s antidumping law or countervailing
duty law.”
284
This is in contrast to the WTO’s DSB, where the secretariat in most cases has been able to keep the
panel selection process moving forward promptly.
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CAFTA-DR, art. 19.1.1, annex 19.1.
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Id., annex 19.1(g).
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Id., art. 19.2, annex 19.2.
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disputes over the interpretations of the Agreement; supervision of committees and
working groups; and other matters that may affect the operation of the Agreement.288
The Commission is also authorized to “establish and delegate responsibilities to
committees and working groups”; modify tariff schedules, rules of origin, interpretative
guidelines for the customs and rules of origin chapters; and annexes for the government
procurement chapter; issue interpretations of Agreement provisions; seek advice of nongovernmental persons or groups; and take other actions agreed upon.289 Most
significantly for this discussion the Commission is empowered with administrative
coordination of the Chapter 20 dispute settlement mechanism, and each Party is required
to designate an office to provide administrative assistance, and to be responsible for the
operation and costs of the office, and provision of fees and expenses for panelists and
experts in the Chapter 20 process.290 These latter functions have been exercised by
national sections of the NAFTA Secretariat291, and one may reasonably assume that the
CAFTA-DR process will operate in the same manner, albeit without the actual creation of
a CAFTA-DR secretariat.
2.

The Dispute Settlement Process

As in NAFTA, the CAFTA-DR parties are encouraged to “endeavor to agree on
the interpretation and application of this Agreement,” and to cooperate and consult on
matters affecting its operation.292 The basic applicability of the dispute settlement
provisions is the same as in NAFTA,293 but in CAFTA it is outlined in greater detail:
(a) with respect to the avoidance or settlement of all disputes between the
Parties regarding the interpretation or application of this Agreement;
(b) wherever a Party considers that an actual or proposed measure of
another Party is or would be inconsistent with the obligations of this
Agreement or that another Party has otherwise failed to carry out its
obligations under this Agreement; and
(c) wherever a Party considers that an actual or proposed measure of
another Party causes or would cause nullification or impairment in the
sense of Annex 20.2.294
“Nullification or impairment” is defined along the lines of the GATT, in terms of actions
by a Party which are not violations of the Agreement but nevertheless “nullify or impair”
“any benefit it [the other Party] could reasonably have expected to accrue to it” under the
provisions of chapters relating to national treatment, market access, rules of origin and
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customs administration/trade facilitation; technical barriers to trade; government
procurement; cross-border services trade; or intellectual property rights.295
A Party seeking dispute settlement must normally make an election among
Chapter 20, another free trade agreement to which the disputing Parties are Party (for
example, a Free Trade Area of the Americas agreement if one is ever negotiated), and the
WTO’s Dispute Settlement Body. Once a forum has been chosen, “the forum selected
shall be used to the exclusion of the others.”296 NAFTA contains substantively similar
language, while requiring that certain matters relating to environmental, standards or
sanitary and phytosanitary issues be exclusively resolved under NAFTA, Chapter 20.297
Conflicts over choice of forum have arisen at least once under NAFTA, when Mexico
requested a WTO panel to refrain from exercising jurisdiction over a dispute with the
United States involving a tax on soft drinks made with high fructose corn syrup, on the
grounds that the issues should be resolved in a NAFTA Chapter 20 proceeding initiated
by Mexico (the latter focusing on Mexico’s access to the U.S. sugar market). However,
the WTO panel and appellate body decided the case, holding that they had no authority to
decline to exercise jurisdiction.298
As in many international arbitration regimes, and in the NAFTA and WTO
Dispute Settlement Body (“DSB”),299 the process in CAFTA-DR begins with a written
request for consultations, in this instance with copies to the other Parties to the
Agreement.300 The reasons, the legal basis for the complaint, and the “actual or proposed
measure or other matter at issue” must all be identified. Another Party may participate in
the consultations upon request within seven days of notice (five days for perishable
goods).301 Should consultations be unsuccessful in resolving the dispute within 60 days
of the request (15 days for perishable goods), any consulting party may request the
Commission to exercise good offices, consultation and mediation.302 A similar request
may be lodged when consultations have been held under the labor, environment or
standards provisions of the Agreement.303 The Commission is directed to meet within 10
days of the request and “shall endeavor to resolve the dispute promptly”; it may at its
discretion call technical advisors, have recourse to other good offices, conciliation or
mediation procedures, or make recommendations, all with the objective of assisting “the
consulting Parties to reach a mutually satisfactory resolution of the dispute.”304 Multiple
proceedings regarding the same measure are to be consolidated.305
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Should the matter be unresolved within 30 to 75 days after the request to the
Commission (depending on whether the matter has been consolidated or involved
perishable goods, or whether the Commission has actually convened), any of the
consulting Parties that requested the Commission to meet “may request in writing the
establishment of an arbitral panel to consider the matter.”306 Here, as in NAFTA,307 the
requests for consultations and a meeting of the Commission are conditions precedent for
the request for convening of an arbitral panel. This means that other than for perishable
goods, it will be at least 90 days between the request for consultations and the request for
establishment of a panel (60 days at the consultation stage and at least 30 days at the
conciliation stage). In the WTO’s DSB, consultations are mandatory, but conciliation is
not; a complaining Member may request the formation of a panel 60 days after the
request for consultations if the matter has not been resolved by consultations, although
the panel request may be blocked (until the next DSB meeting) by any Member at the
first monthly DSB meeting at which the request is lodged, meaning that in the WTO
system it normally takes 90 days from request for consultation to the DSB’s order to form
an arbitral panel.308
As in NAFTA and in the WTO, CAFTA-DR provides for the establishment of a
standing roster of persons to serve as panelists here, within six months after the
Agreement enters into force. 309 NAFTA required the establishment, by January 1, 1994,
of a roster of up to 30 persons, 310 but the NAFTA Parties have unable to agree on such a
formal roster up to now, thirteen years after NAFTA entered into force. Rather, under
NAFTA Chapter 20, panelists have been selected on an ad hoc basis (with a complaining
Party selecting two nationals of the other Party, and vice versa-- a practice abandoned in
CAFTA-DR) and the chairperson of the five person panel being selected by the disputing
Parties from non-NAFTA citizen experts. This has occurred despite language which
indicates that in the absence of agreement between the disputing Parties on a chair, the
chairperson should be selected by a disputing Party chosen by lot, with the only
restriction that the chair not be a national of that disputing Party.311 With CAFTA-DR, as
in NAFTA, panelists must have “expertise or experience in law, international trade or
other matters covered by this Agreement, or the resolution of disputes arising under
international trade agreements . . .” They are to be chosen on the basis of objectivity,
reliability and sound judgment” and be independent of the government; they must comply
with a code of conduct established by the Commission.312
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In a significant departure from the NAFTA text, where at least four of the five
panelists in a given case are citizens of the disputing Parties,313 CAFTA-DR provides that
unless otherwise agreed, of the 70 individuals selected to be roster members, up to eight
will be from each Party, and up to 14 of the 70 will be persons who are not nationals of
any Party. All are to be appointed by consensus, for a minimum of three years.314 This
change likely reflects in part the actual practice under NAFTA, where in each of the three
cases the chairperson was a national of a country other than the disputing Parties.
If the roster is compiled as specified, there will likely be eight nationals each of
the disputing parties, plus the 40 nationals of the other Parties, plus 14 non-CAFTA-DR
country nationals. The process for selecting panelists in CAFTA-DR is similar to that in
NAFTA, with the important explicit proviso that if there is not agreement on a chair
within 15 days of the request for establishment of the panel, the chair is to be chosen by
lot among the (14) roster members that are non-nationals of a disputing Party.315 Each
party is to select its own panelist, “normally” from the roster, with any person selected
other than from the roster subject (as in NAFTA316) to a peremptory challenge by the
other Party, 317 again putting a premium on selection from the roster. If either Party has
failed to designate a panelist within 15 days after selection of the chair, that panelist is
selected by lot from the (eight) nationals of that Party on the roster.318
Whether this panel selection process will work better than that under Chapter 20
remains to be seen. Consensus among seven governments on 70 panelists may be
difficult to achieve; consensus among the three governments on 30 NAFTA panelists has
remained elusive. Without a permanent roster, the rest of the panel selection process will
likely break down, causing significant delays as the disputing Parties argue about panel
selection, and delays along the lines of those found under NAFTA—six to sixteen months
or longer—are likely to occur.319
The Commission is to establish rules of procedure for the operation of the panels,
which will presumably be quite similar to the NAFTA Chapter 20 Rules of Procedure.320
Under NAFTA, as under CAFTA-DR, there must be at least one hearing (as in
NAFTA).321 However, the remaining rules depart significantly from NAFTA provisions.
There is no provision for transparency in NAFTA, and under NAFTA, all submissions
were thus confidential; in the first case, Dairy Products, between the United States and
Canada, there was even a short-lived effort to keep the names of the panelists (other than
313

See NAFTA, art. 2011.1 (where each disputing Party chooses two nationals of the other disputing Party
to serve).
314
CAFTA-DR, art. 20.7.1.
315
Id., art. 20.9.1 (b).
316
NAFTA, art. 2011:3.
317
CAFTA-DR, arts. 20.9.1(c), 20.9.2.
318
Id., arts. 20.9.1(c), 20.9.1(d).
319
See Gantz, supra note 280, at 502-504 (discussing the reasons for the delay in panel selection under
NAFTA Chapter 20).
320
Model Rules of Procedure for Chapter 20 (1994), available at http://www.nafta-secalena.org/DefaultSite/index_e.aspx?CategoryId=74 (visited Aug. 17, 2006).
321
NAFTA, art. 2012.

53

Draft: Jan. 6, 2007
Not to be cited or quoted without author’s permission
the chairperson) confidential!322 Also, the hearings in the most recent NAFTA, Chapter
20 case, Cross Border Trucking Services, held in May 2000, were not public.323
Nor were the transparency measures dictated by the NAFTA Commission with
regard to Chapter 11 investor-state disputes (discussed in Part IV, above) extended to
proceedings under NAFTA, Chapter 20, although discussions among the NAFTA Parties
to this end have apparently been taking place for some time.324 This may well reflect the
lack of any general rule of transparency for government-to-government disputes in the
World Trade Organization, and it is highly unlikely in the author’s view that most of the
WTO Members would support open hearings and prompt disclosure of briefs.
Notwithstanding that general view, several key WTO Members, the United States,
Canada and the European Union, have authorized the panel to make ad hoc arrangements
to open hearings to the public via closed circuit television for hearings affecting those
parties (but not for other WTO Members who appeared in the matter as third parties).325
In CAFTA-DR, in contrast, the rule is transparency, and this is a significant
innovation for government-to-government dispute resolution, which has tended to keep
disputes under wraps at least until they are resolved. Although confidential information
may be protected, the hearings must generally be open to the public; the Parties’ initial
and rebuttal briefs are public except for confidential information; the panel is to consider
requests from NGOs to provide their views (amicus curiae briefs) that “may assist the
panel in evaluating the submissions and arguments of the disputing parties.”326 Also,
unlike NAFTA, where specific panelists are not to be associated with any minority or
majority opinions,327 under CAFTA-DR, “panelists may furnish separate opinions on
matters not unanimously agreed.”328
Other Parties to CAFTA-DR not parties to the particular dispute may upon written
request fully participate in the proceedings through attendance at hearings and making
and receiving written and oral submissions, with those submissions “reflected in the final
report of the panel.”329 Substantially identical language appears in NAFTA and the
NAFTA Party that is not a disputing Party has routinely participated in Chapter 20
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proceedings.330 Similarly, the NAFTA language permitting either a disputing Party or the
panel on its own initiative, “to seek information and technical advice from any person or
body that it deems appropriate” subject to agreement on terms and conditions by the
Parties.331 However, NAFTA language providing for the use of a scientific review board
for environmental or other scientific issues332, does not appear in CAFTA-DR. Separate
opinions are permitted when the panel is not unanimous.333
CAFTA-DR, like NAFTA, contains time limits for the proceedings; in CAFTADR, the initial report of the panel is to be circulated to the Parties “within 120 days after
the last panelist is selected or such other period as the Model Rules of Procedure . . . may
provide.” This initial report is to contain findings of facts, the panel’s “determination as
to whether a disputing Party has not conformed to its obligations under this Agreement”
or of nullification or impairment, along with recommendations if the Parties have so
requested.334 The 120 day rule is not hard and fast; the panel may request more time,
advising the Parties of the reasons for the delay and an estimate of the additional time
required, with the caveat that “in no case should the period to provide the report exceed
180 days.”335
While the initial period is 120 days, instead of the 90 days provided in NAFTA,336
it is still unlikely in the author’s view that the panels will be able to complete this step of
their work in four months. The major delays will likely relate to the briefing schedule
and scheduling of a hearing at a time that is convenient for several governments and three
panelists. In Cross-Border Trucking Services, for example, the final panelist was
selected on February 2, 2000; the briefs were very promptly submitted by Mexico, the
United States and Canada on February 14, February 23, April 3 and April 24; and the
hearing was held on May 17, 2000.337 Post-hearing submissions were solicited by the
panel for submission June 1, later extended to June 9 by request of the Parties.338
Thus, the hearing in Cross-Border Trucking Services took place 106 days after the
last panelist was selected, and the case was not under submission until 128 days after
panel selection. There were no unusual delays in the briefings or the hearing; the Parties
and the panelists all acted promptly in light of the complexities of the legal and factual
issues. Yet the period of time for the case to be ripe for panel decision was 38 days in
excess of the NAFTA time limit, and 8 days in excess of the CAFTA-DR limit,
suggesting that both may be impractical unless the Parties are willing to accept very short
filing and response periods for their submissions. However, in most cases it should be
330
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possible for the panelists to complete the interim report within 180 days; this will be
easier under CAFTA-DR than under NAFTA, because there are only three panelists
rather than five.339 Strong administrative assistance by the national offices designated to
provide administrative assistance to panels340 will facilitate panel compliance with the
deadlines; weak administrative assistance will make such compliance much less likely.
It is anticipated that the Parties will provide comments on the interim report to the
panel within 14 days of the presentation of the report, unless another period is agreed by
the Parties,341 with the panel expected to render a final report 16 days later.342 The 30
day time limit here is the same as in NAFTA.343 It seems unlikely that this time limit will
be strictly met, although the Parties and panelists should be able to come reasonably
close. Again based on the author’s personal experience, such comments are normally
quite valuable to panels and are studied carefully by the panelists; even if the result itself
does not change, the governments’ superior knowledge of details may help the panel
avoid both factual and legal errors.
3.

Implementation of Decisions

Once the final report is provided to the Parties, “the disputing Parties shall agree
on the resolution of the dispute, which normally shall conform with the determinations
and recommendations, if any, of the panel.”344 Where the panel finds that a “disputing
Party has not conformed with its obligation under this Agreement, or that a disputing
Party’s measure is causing nullification or impairment . . . the resolution, whenever
possible, shall be to eliminate the non-conformity or the nullification or impairment.”345
In other words, if a panel finds a violation, the violating Party is expected to correct it,
but they have some flexibility to work things out if both can agree on a solution.
If, however, compliance satisfactory to the prevailing Party does not occur within
45 days, the Parties are expected to enter into negotiations “with a view to developing
mutually acceptable compensation.”346 If the negotiations aren’t successful in an
additional 30 days, or if compensation agreements are not complied with, the
complaining Party may retaliate through the usual (under the WTO and other trade
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agreements347) suspension of benefits, subject to notification as to what the complaining
Party believes are “benefits of equivalent effect” to the protested measure.348 Where
there is a belief by the losing Party that the suspension of benefits proposed is
“manifestly excessive,” it may request that the panel be reconvened to consider the level
of compensation.349
The opportunity to review the level of compensation demanded by the
complaining Party at the outset is something of a departure from NAFTA, where the
alleged excessiveness of the benefits could only be challenged after the fact.350 Under
CAFTA-DR, it is contemplated that a challenge that the suspension is manifestly
excessive is to be resolved by the panel before any suspension takes place, with the
suspension of trade benefits then being in the amount determined by the panel, unless the
panel fails to determine the proper level of suspension.351 This more closely resembles
the parallel requirements in the DSU.352 However, unlike the DSU, where there have
been several proceedings in which the losing Party objected to the magnitude of benefits
to be suspended,353 there is little relevant experience in NAFTA. In the first decision,
Dairy, the panel found no violation of NAFTA by Canada, so no question of compliance
arose.354 In Broom Corn Brooms, Mexico had already suspended certain concessions as
was their right in a safeguards matter, and continued the suspension until the U.S. lifted
the safeguards measures nine months later. In Cross-Border Trucking Services, there has
been long-standing disagreement between the United States and Mexico regarding
implementation of the panel ruling, but no request for suspension of benefits, perhaps
because of continued Mexican trucking industry opposition to opening the border.355
A similar type of challenge is available under Article 20.16.3(b) to the Party
complained against if the complaining Party considers that “it has eliminated the nonconformity or the nullification or impairment that the panel has found.”356 A
“compliance review” is available under Article 20.18 after sanctions have actually been
347
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applied, providing that “[I]f the Party complained against considers that it has eliminated
the non-conformity or the nullification or impairment that the panel has found, it may
refer the matter to the panel by providing written notice to the complaining Party or
Parties.”357 If the panel agrees, the complaining Party or Parties are required to
“promptly reinstate any benefits that Party has or those Parties have suspended . . . .”358
This review of compliance or non-compliance with the panel’s finding of a
violation resembles the WTO “Article 21.5” procedure,359 although in most instances at
the WTO it is the complaining Member, not the Member complained against, that asks
the panel to determine that the alleged compliance was not in fact sufficient. The United
States has been on both sides of this process in the WTO,360 experience which may have
led at least in part to inclusion of this language in CAFTA-DR.
As in NAFTA and the DSU,361 in CAFTA-DR suspension of benefits is to be in
the same sector as affected by the measure, unless this is “not practicable or effective.”
In that instance benefits may be suspended in other sectors.362
A major innovation in CAFTA-DR compared to NAFTA is to provide the Parties
with an alternative to suspension of benefits; the Party committing the violation may by
written notice to the complaining Party agree to pay annual monetary damages, in U.S.
dollars to the complaining Party, in lieu of suspension of trade benefits. If there is no
agreement on the amount, it is set at 50% of the level of trade sanctions, as determined by
the panel, or if there is no panel determination of amounts, by the complaining Party.363
However, the Commission may determine “when circumstances warrant,” that the
assessment “be paid into a fund established by the Commission and expended at the
direction of the Commission for appropriate initiatives to facilitate trade between the
disputing Parties . . . .”364 It isn’t entirely clear how the sequencing would work in terms
of proposed suspension of benefits, a panel determination of the amount of benefits, a
request for the alternative of a monetary assessment and a possible Commission decision
(by consensus of course) to use the funds for trade facilitation instead, but it certainly is
an interesting departure from the traditional suspension of benefits approach.
4.

Special Rules for Labor and Environmental Disputes
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Id., art. 20.18.1.
Id., art. 20.18.2.
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See DSU, supra note 44, art. 21.5 (permitting either disputant to challenge alleged compliance with a
DSB ruling).
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See, e.g., Canada – Measures Affecting the Importation of Milk, WT/DS103, 113/AB/RW2 [New
Zealand, United States], adopted Jan. 17, 2003, European Communities – Anti-Dumping Duties on Imports
of Cotton-Type Bed Linen from India, WT/DS141/AB/RW [India, U.S. as third participant], adopted Apr.
24, 2003); United States – Tax Treatment for “Foreign Sales Corporations,” WT/DS108/AB/RW [EC],
adopted Jan. 29, 2002, all available at http://www.wto.org (visited Aug. 18, 2006) (where alleged
compliance was challenged by complaining Member and others as insufficient).
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Another major change (from NAFTA) results from Chapter 20 jurisdiction over
possible violations of CAFTA-DR’s requirements for enforcement of national labor and
environmental laws. Separate rosters of up to 28 persons each are to be designated for
resolution of disputes arising under the labor and environmental chapters of CAFTA-DR,
all persons with experience in the respective areas, possessing “objectivity, reliability and
sound judgment,” and acting independently of the governments.365
Chapter 20 jurisdiction over labor and environmental issues is also arguably
narrower than with regard to other actions inconsistent with the Agreement. For
example, not every failure to enforce labor laws is grounds for initiating dispute
settlement. Rather, the obligation is as follows: “A Party shall not fail to effectively
enforce its labor laws, through a sustained or recurring course of action or inaction, after
the date of entry into force of this Agreement.”366 Similar language circumscribes actions
under the environmental Chapter 17.367
Moreover, if a panel finds non-compliance with these labor or environmental
obligations, there is no option of suspension of trade benefits. Rather, CAFTA-DR
provides for an “annual monetary assessment” to be determined by the panel, taking into
account such factors as the trade effects of the non-enforcement; its pervasiveness and
duration; the reasons for non-enforcement; the level of enforcement “that could be
reasonably expected of the Party given its resource constraints”; efforts of the party to
remedy non-enforcement; and any other relevant factors.368 The monetary assessment is
to be paid in U.S. dollars, but not to the complaining Party. Rather, the assessment
amounts, which are limited to $15 million annually,369 are to be
paid into a fund established by the Commission and shall be expended at
the direction of the Commission for appropriate labor or environmental
initiatives, including efforts to improve or enhance labor or environmental
law enforcement, as the case may be, in the territory of the Party
complained against, consistent with its law.370
Insulating labor and environmental violations from trade sanctions is one of the
more controversial aspects of CAFTA-DR, but one may reasonably assume that as under
the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation (NAFTA), where there
have been no arbitrations, cases involving these issues that reach Chapter 20 will be few,
due to the relatively high threshold. Given the innovative nature of the use of monetary
assessments as an alternative to trade sanctions generally, and as the only remedy for
non-compliance in labor and environmental disputes, it is not surprising that there is a
mechanism which provides for a review of the effectiveness of these provisions (Articles
20.17 and 20.18) after five years, or after monetary assessments have been assessed in
365
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367
368
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Id., arts. 16.7 (labor) and 17.11(environment).
Id., art. 16.2.1(a); Italics added.
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five proceedings, whichever comes first.371 This suggests, in contrast, that the Parties
during the negotiations believed that the innovative dispute settlement mechanism under
Chapter 20, and the monetary penalty route, would in fact be used on a regular basis.
C.

Domestic Proceedings and Private Commercial Disputes

The three articles in this final section of Chapter 20 reflect several carry-over
provisions from NAFTA. CAFTA-DR, like NAFTA, incorporates mechanism, perhaps
patterned loosely on the “preliminary rulings” jurisdiction of the European Court of
Justice:372
If an issue of interpretation or application of this Agreement arises in any
domestic judicial or administrative proceeding of a Party that any Party
considers would merit its intervention, or if a court or administrative body
solicits the views of a Party, that Party shall notify the other Parties. The
Commission shall endeavor to agree on an appropriate response as
expeditiously as possible.373
If the commission issues an “agreed interpretation,” that interpretation must be submitted
by the Party in whose territory the court is tribunal is located to that court or tribunal, “in
accordance with the rules of that forum.”374 However, if the Commission cannot agree,
“any Party may submit its own views to the court or administrative body in accordance
with the rules of that forum.”375
This mechanism, although never used under NAFTA, could potentially be very
useful in providing guidance on complex issues arising out of the CAFTA-DR. Whether
it can actually function effectively depends in large part on the efficiency of the
Commission. The Commission is not a court with independent judges such as the
European Court of Justice, but rather is comprised of political appointees. It is thus
difficult to predict whether it will be able to deal with legal issues on a timely basis, if at
all. Hopefully, the Commission will issue regulations that detail procedures for
considering requests for advice under this Article 20.20, including time limits for doing
so. Should, as is not unlikely, the Commission be unable or unwilling to serve this
function, the provision also gives the Party that is concerned about a particular issue
(most likely the United States) before another Party’s court an opportunity to make its
own views known.
371

Id., art. 20.19.
Under Article 234 of the Treaty Establishing the European Community, as amended by the Single
European Act, the Treaty of Maastricht and the Treat of Amsterdam (consolidated), Dec. 24, 2002,
available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/treaties/dat/12002E/pdf/12002E_EN.pdf (visited Dec. 15, 2006),
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In CAFTA-DR, as in NAFTA, private actions against another Party on the
grounds that a measure of another Party is inconsistent with the Agreement (NAFTA), or
that the other Party has failed to conform to its obligations under the Agreement
(CAFTA-DR) are barred.376 This reflects long-standing U.S. policy, and language found
in the legislation that approves trade agreements.377 It is probably significant for the
other CAFTA-DR nations as well. Most nations in Latin America use a pure “monist”
system, in which treaties are fully self-executing, that is, in which once approved and in
force they automatically have direct applicability by government agencies, courts and
private parties, even where they create conflicts with existing statutes. 378 In theory, since
trade agreements are automatically the law of the land, they could be the basis of private
citizen actions charging the government with failing to properly implement the
agreements, unless there is some provision in the Agreement barring such legal
actions.379
Finally, CAFTA-DR, like NAFTA, makes some modest effort to encourage
alternative dispute settlement, including arbitration, among private citizens and entities.
CAFTA-DR, in language similar to that in NAFTA, states:
1. Each Party shall, to the maximum extent possible, encourage and
facilitate the use of arbitration and other means of alternative dispute
resolution for the settlement of international commercial disputes between
private parties in the free trade area.

376

NAFTA, art. 2021; CAFTA-DR, art. 2021.
See CAFTA Implementation Act, 19 U.S.C. § 4012(c): “Effect of Agreement with respect to private
remedies: No person other than the United States-- (1) shall have any cause of action or defense under the
Agreement or by virtue of congressional approval thereof; or (2) may challenge, in any action brought
under any provision of law, any action or inaction by any department, agency, or other instrumentality of
the United States, any State, or any political subdivision of a State, on the ground that such action or
inaction is inconsistent with the Agreement.”
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For example, in Chile, international agreements are negotiated, signed and ratified by the President.
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in the official journal, an international trade agreement is the law of the land. Since it has the same status
as a domestic law, and is subsequent, the promulgation of the international agreement automatically repeals
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(signed by the President, Eduardo Frei, and issued by the Ministry of Foreign Relations).
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377

61

Draft: Jan. 6, 2007
Not to be cited or quoted without author’s permission
2. To this end, each Party shall provide appropriate procedures to ensure
observance of agreements to arbitrate and for the recognition and
enforcement of arbitral awards in such disputes. 380
Compliance with paragraph 2 requires only that each of the Parties be a party to the
United Nations Convention on Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, and the InterAmerican Convention on International Commercial Arbitration. All CAFTA-DR Parties
are in fact parties to these two conventions. 381
Also in both agreements, there is provision for establishing an “Advisory
Committee on Private Disputes,” to “report and provide recommendations to the
Commission on general issues referred to it by the Commission respecting the
availability, use and effectiveness of arbitration and other procedures for the resolution of
such disputes in the free trade area” and as considered appropriate, provide technical
cooperation.”382 However, there is an important difference in the wording between
NAFTA and CAFTA-DR. In NAFTA, the Commission “shall establish” the Advisory
Commission, while CAFTA-DR states that the Commission “may establish” it. Thus, the
likelihood that there will be such a committee under CAFTA-DR is by no means certain.
The “2022 Committee” under NAFTA has been something of a disappointment,
as its funding is very limited. (Private sector members pay their own travel costs and per
diem, and there appears to be only funding for the drafting of reports.) The Committee
meets on an annual basis, and in recent years efforts have been made to provide
information on ADR through a section of the NAFTA Secretariat’s website.383 It is
difficult to believe that a similar committee under CAFTA-DR, even if one is established,
will be very active in the absence of significant funding, but it may be unreasonable to
expect governments to support private sector arbitration beyond ensuring that the
necessary agreements for enforcement are in place. In retrospect, it is unfortunate that
CAFTA-DR does not require member governments to enact legislation that would
facilitate the use of ADR within their jurisdictions, particularly with regard to adopting or
improving national legislation recognizing arbitrations held within their territories, and
limiting the extent that local courts may review such arbitral determinations.
VI.

Summary and Conclusions
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The provisions of CAFTA-DR relating to investment disputes and those among
the CAFTA-DR Parties closely follow those applicable for fourteen years under NAFTA,
but with some significant departures. Among the most important innovations in Chapter
10 are changes in the investment protection provisions which appear designed to limit the
scope of “fair and equitable treatment,” customary international law and indirect
expropriation when applied to regulatory takings, along with transparency mechanisms
that were added to NAFTA only gradually and after the fact. With regard to governmentto-government disputes, in addition to greater transparency of the process and the
possibility of monetary penalties for non-compliance instead of trade sanctions, the major
innovation relates to coverage, albeit circumscribed, of actions in which it is charged that
a Party is failing to enforce its own labor or environmental laws.
Frequency of usage is always difficult to predict. If CAFTA-DR is successful in
stimulating U.S. investment in the territories of the other six Parties, it is almost
inevitable that there will be some investment disputes eventually. Whether the Chapter
10 provisions will be used in investor disputes among the other six Parties is more
problematic, although there is some indication that the use of investor-state dispute
settlement is increasing among developing nations.384 Chapter 20—government-togovernment disputes—likely will be used only sparingly, at least at first. Many of the
trade disputes arising among the CAFTA-DR Parties are likely to be subject to WTO
jurisdiction, as in the conflict between Honduras and the Dominican Republic over
cigarettes,385 even if the Parties would now have the option of choosing CAFTA-DR
Chapter 20.386 If NAFTA provides any basis for predictions, CAFTA-DR Parties will
prefer WTO dispute settlement unless the CAFTA-DR Parties move expeditiously to
create the standing roster that will enable prompt formation of panels. One can also hope
and expect that the U.S. government will use diplomacy and gentle pressures in situations
where the other Parties are failing to comply immediately and strictly with their
obligations under the Agreement.387 As with courts and other types of dispute settlement
mechanisms, the measure of their success is not only the number of cases submitted to
court or arbitration, but those which were settled amicably because the formal mechanism
existed.
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